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Abstract
Cyber-insurance is a powerful economic concept that can help com-
panies in a world where cybercrime exist. From the early 80s, several
researchers claimed that cyber-insurance had a bright future, and could
become an important economic tool for handling residual cyber-risks.
The market study for this thesis revealed that both the European and
US cyber-insurance market have failed to become a relevant factor for the
ICT industry. Even though the US market has matured more than the
European market, they are both far away from realizing their potential.
Innovative approaches to handle the unique problems of cyber-insurance
are needed.
This thesis takes a new approach towards solving some of the problems
of cyber-insurance. First, network structures with properties that made
them superior as cyber-insurance networks were found and characterized.
Then several models for forming these network structures were introduced
and analyzed using game theory and a simulation tool called Netlogo.
In every model, new properties that relate the model to the real world
and real-world insurance products are introduced. The results show that
insurers can use the insurance premium as a tool for determining the
resulting formation of the network. If the insurance premium is set to
the right level, these superior structures will evolve.
We believe our findings could help the cyber-insurance market evolve,
by giving insurers a proper tool to better analyze and control formation
of cyber-insurance networks.
Further work should try mapping our models and simulations to real-
world networks more extensively. This could be achieved by finding and
introducing more realistic risk functions, and by letting nodes choose
their neighbors by preference, not randomly.

Sammendrag
Cyberforsikring er et kraftfullt økonomisk konsept som kan støtte bedrifter
i en verden full av nettkriminalitet. Forskere har fra starten av 80-tallet
spådd en lys fremtid for cyberforsikring, og har ment at det kunne bli et
viktig økonomisk verktøy for å håndtere cyberrisiko.
Markedsundersøkelsen i denne oppgaven avdekket at hverken det
europeiske eller det amerikanske markedet for cyberforsikring har greid å
bli en viktig faktor i IKT-industrien. Selv om det amerikanske markedet er
noe bedre utviklet enn det europeiske, så har begge langt igjen. Det trengs
nye og innovative framgangsmåter for å håndtere de unike problemene
knyttet til cyberforsikring.
Denne oppgaven presenterer en ny tilnærming for å prøve å løse noen
av problemene knyttet til cyberforsikring. Først ble nettverksstrukturer
med egenskaper som gjorde dem spesielt godt egnet som cyberforsikrings-
nettverk funnet og definert. Deretter ble flere modeller for å skape disse
nettverksstrukturene introdusert og analysert gjennom spillteori, og ved
bruk av simuleringsverktøyet «Netlogo». I hver modell ble nye egenskaper
introdusert, der hver egenskap kunne relateres til den virkelige verden
og til virkelige forsikringsprodukter, slik at modellene ble mer realistiske.
Resultatene viste at forsikringsselskapene kan bruke forsikringspremien
som et verktøy for å bestemme den resulterende nettverksformasjonen.
Hvis forsikringspremien blir satt til riktig nivå, så vil de spesielt godt
egnete nettverksstrukturene oppstå.
Vi mener at våre modeller og resultater kan hjelpe cyberforsikrings-
markedet til å utvikle seg, og vil kunne gi forsikringsselskaper et egnet
verktøy til å analysere og kontrollere hvordan cyberforsikringsnettverk
utvikles.
Fremtidig arbeid bør søke å la modellene og simuleringene i denne
oppgaven nærme seg den virkelige verdens nettverk ytterligere. Dette kan
gjøres ved å finne og introdusere mer realistiske risikofunksjoner, og ved
å la noder opprette linker etter preferanse heller enn tilfeldig.
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Chapter1Introduction to Cyber Insurance
1.1 Motivation
Security breaches are increasingly prevalent in the Internet age, causing huge financial
losses for companies and their users. Cyber-insurance is a powerful economic concept
that can help companies in the fight against such malicious behavior. Earlier research
suggests that cyber-insurance has failed to reach its promising potential, although
the concept of cyber-insurance has been around since the 1980s.
The researchers claims that a functional model for cyber-insurance has to handle
the problems regarding interdependent security, correlated risk and asymmetrical
information. Many researchers have proposed models to solve these problems, but the
market still strives to succeed. Another problem with cyber-insurance is to determine
the overall risk in the network. If cyber-insurance networks were describable and
analyzable by graphs, the calculation of overall risk would be much easier. We
ask whether there exist network structures that are superior as cyber-insurance
networks compared to other networks. If so, is it possible for insurers to determine
the structure of these networks, or even better to create new or transform existing
networks into a certain structure?
1.2 Problem definition
In this project, the goal is to analyze the current state of the cyber-insurance market.
Study and characterize network structures suited to be used as a cyber-insurance
network. A desired structure will possess some characteristics that would be beneficial
for a cyber-insurance network. Additionally, we will build a model, which can relate
to different real world scenarios, using network formation to force the creation of
these structures.
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1.3 Reader’s guide
Chapter 1 introduces the concept of cyber-insurance and presents a survey of the
current cyber-insurance market.
Chapter 2 discusses and summarizes related work.
Chapter 3 shows how graphs can describe real-world networks, such as airline routes
and stock markets. The chapter also presents and discusses the properties of graphs
well suited for cyber-insurance networks. These graphs are the foundation for the
models created in chapter 5.
Chapter 4 presents the basic concepts of graphs and game theory. It also presents
the simulation tool, Netlogo, used to simulate the different models of Chapter 5.
Chapter 5 presents different endogenous1 network formation models, where the nodes
are agents, with or without insurance, seeking to establish links with eachother.
Chapter 6 discusses and summarizes the findings in the thesis, with focus on chapter
5.
1.4 Introduction
Security breaches are increasingly prevalent in the Internet age causing huge financial
losses for companies and their users. When facing security breaches and risk, there
are typically four ways to act [BL08b]:
1. Avoid the risk
2. Retain the risk
3. Self protect and mitigate the risk
4. Transfer the risk
The ICT industry have so far tried to prevent risks with a mixture of options two
and three. This has lead to many different techniques and software trying to detect
threats and anomalies, to protect the users and infrastructure. Firewalls, intrusion-
detection and prevention systems, are some of the solutions. These will reduce the
risk, but do not eliminate the risk completely. Although they are all good and
needed actions, it is impossible to achieve perfect cyber-security, due to many reasons:
Threats are continuously evolving, there will always be accidents and security flaws,
attackers have different intentions, network externalities and free-riding in security
networks, the lemons-market in security products, misaligned incentives between
users and product vendors, and many more. This is why we need cyber-insurance, as
an fourth option, to handle the residual risk [LB09, PH13].
1Exogenous: The network formation is given. Endogenous: The structure originates from within
the network, i.e. the opposite of exogenous
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Market potential for cyber-insurance. Just like regular insurance, cyber-
insurance is an insurance product used to transfer financial risk, associated with
computers and network-related incidents, over to a third party. This third party
willingly accepts the risk, in exchange for a fee, called insurance premium. The
insurance is focused on computer-related issues, and could provide coverage against
property loss and theft, data damage, cyber-extortion, loss of income due to denial
of service attacks or computer failures, reduced reputation and customers churning
due to leaked user information and so on. Traditional insurance policies rarely cover
incidents like these, therefore a specialized insurance product is needed to handle
these residual risks. I.e. there is a huge potential market for cyber-insurance [PD12].
As mentioned, the concept of cyber-insurance has been around since the 1980s,
and has failed to reach its promising potential. There might be several reasons for this
slow development, however, it is believed that the main reason so far, is that no model
deals with all the unique problems of cyber-insurance at the same time. In addition
to the known difficulties of insurance, such as calculating risk, cyber-insurance differs
from traditional insurance because it has to deal with the problem of asymmetric
information, correlated risk and interdependent security [GGJ+10].
Traditional Insurance. The basic structure of cyber-insurance relates to
traditional insurance, where an insurance contract (policy) binds the insurance
company to pay a specified amount to the insurance holder whenever an incident
occurs. In return, the insurance holder has to pay a fixed monthly or annual fee
(premium) to the insurance company. The contract includes a risk assessment of
the company’s vulnerability and clearly specifies the entitled amount of coverage for
each of the different risks. These assessments are used to calculate the companies’
premium [Rob12]. Generally, this means that the security is negatively correlated
with the premium costs. In cyber-insurance this means that the better the security,
the lower the price on the insurance premium.
Generally, to ensure that their business is economically viable, the insurance com-
pany will require that insurable risks possess seven distinct characteristics [MCR80]:
1. Large number of similar exposure units: Insurance is based on the principle of
pooling resources, where insurance policies are offered to individual members
of a large class. Meaning the more customers, the closer the predicted losses
will get to the actual losses.
2. Definite loss: A loss should take place at a known time, in a known place and
from a known cause. Incidents such as a fire or car crash, are examples where
these terms are easy to verify.
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3. Accidental loss: The event that triggers a claim should not be something the
insurer has discretion or control over.
4. Large loss: The size of the loss must be meaningful from the perspective of the
insured. Insurance premiums need to cover both the expected cost of the loss,
and in addition, cover all the expenses regarding issuing and administrating
policies, adjusting losses and supplying the capital needed to be able to pay
claims.
5. Affordable premium: The premium must be proportional to the security
offered, otherwise no one will offer/buy the insurance. In the situation where
the likelihood of the insured event is high, and the cost is large, it is unlikely
that the insurance company will offer the insurance, or if so the premium would
be very high.
6. Calculable loss: Both the probability and the cost of an insurable event, has to
at least be possible to estimate.
7. Limited risk of catastrophically large losses: If losses happen all at the same time,
the likelihood of the insurance company getting bankrupt is high. Therefore,
losses are ideally independent and non-catastrophic.
This model will also apply to the risks covered by cyber-insurance. Unfortunately
there are additional obstacles regarding cyber-insurance. The three major problems
with cyber-insurance are related to; information asymmetry, interdependent security
and correlated risk.
Information asymmetry. Information asymmetry arises when one side of a
transaction or decision has more or better information than the other party. There
are two different cases of information asymmetry. The first one is called adverse
selection, where one party simply has less information regarding the performance of
the transaction. A good example is when buying health insurance, if a person with
bad health purchases insurance, and the information about her health is not available
to the insurer, we have a classical adverse selection scenario, where the insurer
probably charges too little. We can observe a similar situation for the cyber-industry,
where an insurer has no way of confirming whether your network is "healthy", i.e. not
contaminated or infected. The other information asymmetry scenario is called moral
hazard. It occurs after the signing of the contract, where one party deliberately takes
some action that makes the possibility of loss higher, e.g. choosing not to lock your
door, since you have insurance. Or in the computer setting, deliberately visiting
hostile web-pages, or not using anti-virus software, firewalls or other self-protection
software, although you are required to do so [Pal12].
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The task of measuring the level of security is very hard, and in order to lower the
premiums people will have an incentive for hiding information about their security
level, hence the problem with asymmetry is highly relevant. Another problem occurs
on the customer side of the market. For a customer wanting to improve his/her
defense mechanisms, the software security market often becomes a lemon’s market2.
It is difficult for the buyer to distinguish the performance of different software
products, and thus the reasonable thing to do, is to buy the cheapest. Therefore,
the good security products must cost the same as the bad. If the cost of producing
good security software is too high, the problem can even result in abandoning the
production of good software, because it would not be profitable.
Correlated risk. Another big concern regarding cyber-insurance, is the corre-
lated risk. Among other things, the problem occurs due to the need for standards.
Standardization is an important part of the business of computers and computer
networks. Generally it enables computers to communicate, install and use different
software. A good example is operative systems for personal computers, today we only
have a small set of operative systems available, and these systems are standardized,
so they can use the same communication channels. The standards generate a lot of
the value in the ICT industry, but they also make many threats possible. All systems
that use the same standards, create a large number of similar exposure units, i.e. they
share common vulnerabilities, which could be exploited at the same time. As we see,
this violates the insurance characteristic of limited risk of catastrophically large losses.
Thus create a significant difficulty for the cyber-insurance industry, because when a
security breach occurs there is a high probability that it will occur to a large number
of people, i.e. catastrophic and extreme events occur with a higher probability than
in the regular insurance business. To compensate, the logical thing to do would be
to raise the premium cost, this could however violate the characteristics of affordable
premiums and large losses. If the security breach is large, it could even potentially
cause so much damage, that the insurers will not be able to pay all the customers
who suffered, and they could go bankrupt [BS10].
Interdependent security. Another problem in the ICT industry is interde-
pendent security, meaning that you are not only dependent on your own investment
in security, but also on everyone else’s. Investment in security generates positive
externalities, and as public goods, this encourages free riding. Why should I pay for
security when I can just free ride on security invested by others? The problem is
2Lemon market, the problem of quality uncertainty, was first introduced in a paper [Ake97] by
the economist George Akerlof in 1970,and used the market for used cars as an example [Wik]. The
conclusion of the paper is that since the buyers lack information to distinguish a bad car(lemon)
from a good one(cherry), the buyer will not pay the price the seller wants for a cherry, and the
seller will not sell a cherry for the price of a lemon, and thus the lemons drive the cherries out of
the market.
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that the reward for a user investing in self-protection depends on the security in the
rest of the network. i.e. The expected loss due to a security breach at one agent in
the network, is not only dependent on this agent’s level of investment in security, but
also on the security investment done by adjacent agents, and their adjacent agents
and so forth. A good example of this is the amount of spam sent every day, which
depends on the number of compromised computers. Meaning if you have invested
in security software of some kind, you still receive lots of spam because many other
people have not invested [Böh10].
Calculating losses As mentioned, a problem in several areas of insurance is
the calculation of risk. In cyber-insurance, the unique obstacles contribute to making
this particularly difficult. When facing a security breach there are two potential loss
classes [BMR09, MCR80]:
– Primary losses or first-degree losses: direct loss of information or data and
operating loss. These arise from disuse, abuse or misuse of information. The
cost of these arises from recovering, loss of revenue, PR and information sharing
costs, hiring of IT specialists etc.
– Secondary losses are indirectly triggered. These are the loss of reputation,
goodwill, consumer confidence, competitive strength, credit rating and customer
churning.
The cost of the loss from both these classes can be difficult to determine, although
the second one is probably the most difficult, since it is challenging to put a value
on e.g. how many potential customers did they lose due to the reputation loss, how
many customers churned, and what was their value etc. It could also be difficult
to determine when the loss happened, where and what caused it. Another problem
when calculating losses and determining insurance premiums, is the unavailablity of
large amounts of historic data on cyber-crimes, which are needed in many insurance
models to calculate the risk, losses and premiums. This problem arises i.a. because
many firms do not reveal details about their experienced security breaches [HH07].
Cyber-insurance instead of security. Another problem with cyber-insurance
is actors seeing it as a solution to the problem of being secure. Instead of investing
in security, they now have a way of buying their way out. However, as the paper
[BL08a] shows, this problem might be solved with the right pricing options, meaning
that the insurance companies can create pricing models which make it economically
beneficial to invest in security and cyber-insurance. Cyber-insurance can be used as
an incentive for buying security. Such models will also make sense for the insurance
company, since better security systems yields lower probability for incidents.
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As we see there are many problems regarding cyber-insurance, but the insurance
industry has been dealing with many difficult problems in other areas of life. Cyber-
insurance faces many challenges, but we can’t say that internet risks and damages
can not be insured. We just need to find a way of helping the insurers to create a
better product, i.e. the challenge is to find a way for the insurers to handle these
special characteristics, in order to create a healthy cyber-insurance market [LB09].
To help establishing a healthy cyber-insurance market, one needs to know its current
status.
1.5 The cyber-insurance market
The market for cyber-insurance emerged in the late 80’s, when security software
companies began collaborating with insurance companies to offer insurance policies
together with their security products. From a marketing perspective, adding insurance
helped highlighting the supposedly high quality of the security software. Nevertheless,
this new product was a comprehensive solution, which dealt with both risk reduction
and residual risk [BL08b]. Continuing into the beginning of the new millennium,
several companies started offering standalone cyber-insurance, which sat the frame
for the current insurance product. In Norway, startup-companies, such as Safensure
AS were established with the goal to deliver cyber-insurance to the Norwegian and
European market [dig]. In addition, already well-established insurance companies,
such as Gjensidige Nor, started offering insurance products intended for the web-site
market. These insurances were created to insure lost income due to malicious hackers,
denial of service and other well know cyber-attacks at that time. In 2001 Gjensidige
Nor, in cooperation with the German company Tela Versicherung, offered businesses
insurance against financial losses due to hacker attacks and sabotage in a range up to
5 million NOK, given that the companies could provide proof that specified security
measures were taken [it].
Despite the fact that cyber-insurance has been around for a couple of decades,
the market still struggles to gain a foothold. Safensure AS does not longer exist
and Gjenside Nor does not advertise a cyber-insurance product anymore. There
seems to be many challenges for both buyers and sellers. Buyers face tremendous
confusion about cyber risks and their potential impacts on business. The paper
[PpD12] points out that people do not know or understand what kinds of risks the
cyber-space involves, and how fatal the losses can be. Even when companies have
decided to purchase a cyber-insurance, they are confused with what kind of insurance
they should purchase, it is difficult to see what it covers, what is a reasonable price
etc. Thus, the market for cyber-insurance tends to become a lemon.s market, where
the buyer lacks knowledge, and struggles to see the differences between the different
insurance contracts.
8 1. INTRODUCTION TO CYBER INSURANCE
The UK and US markets. We wanted to reveal the current status of the
cyber-insurance market. We limited our survey to the UK and US markets, in
addition to the Norwegian market. The first impression reveals that there are several
different results and opinions regarding the health of the global cyber-insurance
market. The paper [Ins11] studied a sample of 50 organizations in various industry
sectors, located in the United States. They showed that on average every company
suffered more than one successful attack every week, and argued that successful
cyber-attacks could have serious financial consequences. They found that the median
cost of cyber-crime in the U.S is $5.9 million per year, ranging from $1.5 million to
$36.5 million per company, which is a 56 % increase from 2010.
Another paper [Ris12] collected statistics about cyber-attacks in the UK, and
claims that the costs are expected to be £27 billion a year, which makes cyber-crime
one of UK’s biggest emerging threats. In addition, the paper pointed out that the
victims are not only large companies like Google and PlayStation, but also small
businesses. Despite these numbers, only 35 % of the companies in the survey had
purchased cyber-insurance. This is surprisingly low, since they found no shortage of
providers. It was revealed that in the UK there are nine insurers who specializes in
cyber-insurance, and in the US around 30-40 insurers.
A UK firm, called CFC underwriting, who offers insurance to small and medium
sized businesses, published an article [New] claiming promising numbers for the US
cyber-insurance market. On US soil, 20-50% of the businesses purchased either
standalone cyber-insurance or benefits from coverage provided in their existing
insurance. However, despite recent years’ focus on the increasing cyber-crime activity
and the catastrophic consequences of having weak security, only 1% of European
businesses are enrolled in an insurance program covering cyber-threats. A more
optimistic survey, [Pra], pointed out that more and more insurance companies offer
cyber-insurance. Yet, of the 13000 companies, only 46 % reported that they were
insured against the economic consequences of cyber-attacks.
The media coverage on corporate threats such as Stuxnet and the attacks on
Playstation, which lead to a compromise of 77 million user accounts including credit
card numbers [Chu], shows that the cyber-threats are growing, and one would assume
that we are in need of cyber-insurance. However, even though the number varies, the
surveys show that a large share of companies have chosen not to protect themselves
against the residual risk of cyber-attacks, by buying cyber-insurance.
The Norwegian market. Our survey of the Norwegian insurance market
revealed that specialized cyber-insurance companies, such as Safensure AS, do not
exist anymore. Only one out of the five biggest insurance companies3 offers something
3Gjensidige, If Skadeforsikring, DNB, TRYG, Storebrand
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similar to a cyber-insurance. Gjensidige Nor offers what they call operation-loss-
insurance, which covers expenses due to reconstruction of files and reinstalling
software and denial of service attacks. In addition, it is also possible to insure against
hacking and sabotage [Nor]. From email correspondence with Gjensidige Nor it
was clear that they needed lots of information regarding the company to be able to
calculate the insurance premium. They required extensive information about the
economic health of the company, and a model of what kind of software and hardware
where used with estimated values on each component. Unfortunately, we were not
able to obtain the cost of such an insurance.
Market outlook. The survey from [New] claimed that the US cyber-insurance
market was much more mature than the European market. A possible reason is the
breach notification laws. In the US, 46 states have mandatory breach notification
laws, combined with significant penalties for companies failing to protect sensitive
data. This means that the US government is creating incentives for firms to buy
cyber-insurance. In Europe, only Germany and Austria have similar laws, forcing
companies to notify affected customers of data leakage. A recent proposal of the
EU wants to introduce the notification law in Europe, and also include penalties
for serious data breaches, which could be set as high as 2 % of a company’s global
revenue [New]. It is proposed that the law should take effect in 2014, although this
is highly unlikely, considering the complexity of the effects of this law. Undoubtedly
such a law would be a healthy injection to the cyber-insurance market. However,
a market based on fear of the consequences of not being insured is not desirable.
The ultimate goal for cyber-insurance is to correlate the purchase of cyber-insurance
with companies growing desire to invest in more security, and hence lower the risk of
being a victim of cyber-crimes. The article claims that the way to meet this goal, is
to focus on the serious brand damage a company will experience and not just on the
financial loss.
In summary, the cyber-insurance market seems to have a huge potential, but
needs some new thinking to fully take advantage of it. We will take another approach
and focus on finding network structures that will help the insurers offer fair contracts,
which is beneficial for both the customers and the suppliers. Hopefully, this can help
in the process of establishing a healthy cyber-insurance market.

Chapter2Related work
2.1 Cyber-insurance
While several authors have expressed doubts about the future of cyber-insurance,
the authors of [BS10] still have faith in the prevalence of cyber-insurance. The paper
describes the three main problems of cyber-insurance as mentioned in chapter 1
of this thesis; information asymmetry, correlated risk and interdependent agents.
They argue that a model for cyber-insurance has to overcome each of these obstacles.
Instead of presenting a solution, they propose a framework to classify models of
cyber-insurance. The framework breaks the modeling down to five key components:
– network environment (nodes controlled by agents, who extract utility. Risk
arises here.)
– demand side (agents)
– supply side (insurers)
– information structure, distribution of knowledge among the players.
– organizational environment. Public and private entities whose actions affect
network security and agent’s security decisions.
The goal is that this unifying framework will help navigating the literature and
stimulate research that results in a more formal basis for policy recommendations
involving cyber-risk reallocation. [BS10] encourage answering questions such as;
under what conditions will a cyber-insurance market thrive? What is the effect of an
insurance market, -will the Internet be more secure? Does cyber-insurance contribute
to social welfare? Böhme, et.al. also analyze several other papers on cyber-insurance,
and show how all of them are touching the problems and key components showed
above, but no paper handles all of them. The paper studies other existing models,
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and reveals a discrepancy between informal arguments in favor of cyber-insurance
and analytic results questioning the viability of a cyber-insurance market.
The paper [MYK06] summarizes the evolution of cyber-insurance, from the
early primitive hacker insurance policies, to the modern and comprehensive cyber-
insurances. The insurances have evolved, since the insurers have better understanding
of the risks and the needs of the businesses. They show how insurers are addressing
the adverse selection and moral hazard problem, by classifying the risk level of
the insured. They do so by requesting lots of background information about the
customers. The paper presents a methodology for calculating the social welfare loss
due to adverse selection. The paper is optimistic about the future of cyber-insurance,
and concludes that cyber-insurance is making the Internet a safer environment,
because insurers are giving users economic incentives to self-protect.
The paper [PGP11] from Pal, et.al. presents a cyber-insurance model which
handles both risks due to security (e.g virus) and non-security related features such
as power outage and hardware failure. Their model, Aegis, is a simple model in which
the user accepts a fraction of loss recovery and the rest is transferred to the insurance
company. Pal, et.al. show that when it is mandatory to purchase insurance, risk
averse agents would prefer Aegis contracts over traditional cyber-insurance products.
The model also gives users an incentive to take greater responsibility in securing
their own systems. Hence this answers one of the questions from [BS10]: The overall
security of the Internet will increase if Aegis is offered to the market. An interesting
result from their analysis is the fact that a decrease/increase in the insurance premium
may not always lead to increase/decrease in demand. From the insurer’s point of
view, this feature means that it might be possible to increase margins without losing
market share. Hence, it will be easier to create a market for cyber-insurance.
[PH12] adopts a topological perspective in proposing a mechanism that accounts
for the positive externalities (due to purchase of security mechanisms) and network
location of users. In addition the authors provide an appropriate way of proportionally
imposing fines/rebates on user premiums. This feature relates to our model, where a
central node in the network receives a bulk insurance discount, in order to facilitate
the creation of star topologies.
[PH13] presents the importance of discriminating network users in insurance
contracts. This is done to prevent adverse selection, partly internalizing the negative
externalities of interdependent security, achieving maximum social welfare, helping
a risk-averse insurer to distribute costs of holding safety capital among its clients,
and insurers sustaining a fixed amount of profit per contract. The paper proposes a
mechanism to pertinently contract discriminate insured users when having complete
network information. This is important since almost every node in the network is
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different from other nodes. Hence we need a way of distinguishing good nodes from
bad ones by the means of premium price.
High correlation in failures in information systems is a huge concern to the cyber-
insurance market. The paper [BK06] introduces a new classification of correlation
properties. The authors divide it into two levels, the first level is the correlation
within firms, and the second level addresses the global correlations. Further, they
create an economic model for risk arrival at these two levels, and use it in simulations
to find where a market for cyber-insurance can exist or not. Böhme, et.al. results
show that cyber-insurance is best suited for risk-classes where internal correlation
is high, and the global correlation is low. This could be one of the reasons for the
failure of cyber-insurance so far, the insurers have focused on the wrong markets, i.e.
the markets with high global correlation and low internal correlation. One problem
with [BK06] is that they do not cover interdependent security neither discuss the
problem of information asymmetry.
The papers [BL08a, BL08b] present how risk management on the internet have
only introduced methods to reduce the risks, such as firewalls, intrusion detection
systems, anti virus etc. But none of these have managed to remove the risk completely.
As mentioned in chapter 1, there are four possible ways of removing risk: avoid it,
retain it, self-protect and mitigate it or transfer the risk. Most entities on the internet
have chosen a mix of of retaining and mitigate by self-protecting. These solutions do
not eliminate risk completely, and threats evolve over time. Thus, the only option
for completely removing the risk, is to transfer it to a party who willingly accepts
it, in exchange for a fee. The key result of these papers is that they show economic
reasons for users to not invest in self-protection, and that cyber-insurance will act
as an incentive for users to acquire self-protection, i.e. the level of security in the
internet will increase with cyber-insurance. The reason for this positive spiral is that
investment in insurance will result in overall higher payoff, and since the premiums
discriminate users based on the investment in self protection, it will act as a strong
incentive to acquire self-protection.
In contrast to the papers [BL08a, BL08b], the paper [SSFW10] claims that in a
competitive cyber-insurance market the users’ utility will improve, but the network
security will worsen relative to a market without cyber-insurance. By competitive
insurers Shetty et.al, mean that there are several insurance contracts to choose from,
and user choose the one that increases their utility the most. [SSFW10] create and
explains two models, in the first one the insurers suffer from information asymmetry
regarding the users’ investment in security. For most of the parameters used, there
will not be offered any insurance in an equilibrium, due to the moral hazard problem.
In the second model, the insurer is able to observe the users’ security investment,
and can thus contract discriminate bad and good users, i.e. no moral hazard is
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present. In this model the insurance increases the users’ utility, but it does not result
in overall better security.
The paper [RKK08] also claims that so far in security management of the internet,
there is no solution to the residual risk. To solve this the authors come up with an
insurance policy, which they claim can survive in a competitive market. However,
this solution does not cover the problem of correlated risk. The actors in the model
from [RKK08] are the ISP, who is also the insurer, and the users, the users are of
type high- or low-risk users. The question asked is whether a policy that brings
profit to the ISPs while protecting the users from risk, exists. Radosavac, et.al find
an optimal insurance policy that can be offered to both low and high risk users.
Additionally, they also conclude that even when there is an insurance for residual
risk, it cannot be guaranteed that a profitable business model exists.
The paper [DS06] describes an interesting network formation game. Although
the paper tries to observe susceptibility to sybil attacks in peer-to-peer networks,
the approach used for network formation can be related to our thesis. The game’s
characteristics is as follows: Nodes are either friends or strangers, and the goal of the
nodes is to selfishly try to fulfill own communication needs. The nodes’ needs is to
communicate with as many as possible of their friends. This can be achieved either
by direct or indirect connections. Every node has a link budget, i.e. a maximum
number of links it can establish, and a set of friends it wants to connect to. [DS06]
proposes two random games where nodes might have to take the risk of connecting
to non-insured nodes.
1. Random model: Every node in the network initiates a set of friendships with
other nodes, denoted F . All nodes have the same link budget L < F .
2. Unbalanced Random Mode. The same friendship graph as in the random model
is created. However, one of the nodes has a significantly larger link budget
(L0 > 2F )
The first model does not result in any equilibrium, except the one where friends only
connect to other friends. The other model shows some new insights, when the link
budget is comparable to their number of friends, most nodes still choose to only
connect to friends. However, when the link budget is set to only one link, except for
the rich node, then the resulting equilibrium is a star topology.
Summary. There are many different papers that have described the problems
of cyber-insurance, and proposed different models and solutions. However, as we
revealed, the cyber-insurance market is yet far from established and still has lots
of potential. Each of the presented models has a slightly different angle towards
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improving the cyber-insurance market. Although promising result presented in the
papers, few improvements have appeared in the market, and it seems that another
approach is needed. This is what we intend to do in this thesis. In brief, we will
now investigate whether there are any advantageous structures for cyber-insurance
and in chapter 5 see if it is possible for networks to evolve endogenously into these
structures.

Chapter3Graphs and Network Formation
In nature and society, many scenarios can be described using graphs. Infrastructure,
such as railroads, water pipelines and electricity grid, societal relationships and disease
epidemics, can all be visualized using graphs. Cyber-insurance is no exception, and
can also be structured as a graph. This is of interest because, when one can describe a
phenomenon with graphs, it is easier to analyze and possibly find some characteristics,
hence the graph can be used as an analytic tool [Aud].
Several studies have been done on the characteristics of different graphs, such as
E-R graphs and A-B graphs (scale-free graphs), these are thoroughly described in the
methodology chapter of this thesis. In addition, one has found special characteristics
of star-shaped graphs and cliques. This chapter will highlight which characteristics
that are desirable in the cyber-insurance market, and which structures that possess
these characteristics. These findings will serve as the foundation of our models, where
we try to force these graph structures to emerge.
3.1 Real-world graph structures
As a starting point, let’s have a look at a couple of real-world examples of how
complex systems with huge amount of data could be structured as graphs. We will
see how complex structures become rather intuitive when presented as graphs. By
looking at the graph structure, one can determine what type of graph that appears,
and hence certain characteristics will apply.
Stock markets. The research paper [Gar07] analyzes the correlation between
different stocks in the Greek stock market in year 1997. The authors compared
the daily closing price of stock i at day t, and compared the similarity of a pair of
stocks i and j by using the correlation coefficient. The idea is that the correlation
coefficient between a pair of stocks can be expressed using different distances in a
graph structure. A short distance means high correlation and a long distance means
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low correlation between the stocks. Normally, this network would be shown as a
fully connected graph, which will consist of n(n−1)2 edges, and would be difficult to
analyze. However, the new approach presents a clear and understandable graph,
consisting of (n− 1) edges showing the correlations between the stocks.
The resulting graph can be seen in Figure 3.1, and shows a network consisting of
several clusters linked together. Instead of having to analyze a complex system with
huge amounts of data, the stock market can be analyzed by its topological properties,
such as the high clustering coefficient, i.e a scale free topology, which will among
other things point out which stocks have the most influence on others.
Figure 3.1: Network obtained by comparing two stocks’ correlation coefficient in
the Greek stock market (Athens Stock Exchange, ASE) in year 1997. The different
colors represent the different sectors of economic activity [Gar07].
Airline routes. Another real-world network which shows the same character-
istics as scale-free graphs is the map of airline routes. Figure 3.2 shows the US
route map of the American airline company SkyWest. The characteristic clustering
emerges in the figure, where a majority of the flights departing from either Denver,
Chicago or San Francisco. Not surprisingly, these airports are all in the top 7 busiest
airports in the US [Faa], and serve as hubs for many of SkyWest’s flights. In the
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airline industry some airports are called hubs, because that’s what they are, - a
connection point for major parts of the network of flights. The network of flights,
as depicted in Figure 3.2, follows the characteristics of A-B graphs. Hence, as we
can confirm from looking at the graph, the network are vulnerable against direct
attacks, meaning that shutting down a low degree airport wont create much trouble.
However, if one of the hubs is forced to close, it will provoke huge delays throughout
the whole network, because a majority of the destinations is interconnected via the
hubs.
Figure 3.2: SkyWest Airline’s combined route map [CfAPA].
Here, both examples can be characterized as scale-free networks, and the work
done by Albert and Barabási shows that a large part of natural systems is in fact
scale-free graphs [Aud]. Since we are able to determine the graph’s type, which in
this case is a scale-free graph, we now know that the graph is vulnerable to attacks
directed towards the hubs, i.e. the hubs need to be secured. For example, if a delay
occurs at an airline hub, these delays will probably cascade throughout the network.
This shows the strength of being able to structure systems as graphs. When certain
structures appear, one can assume that the network will behave according to a set
of rules. This is why we wish to determine whether there are any structures that
possess preferred characteristics for cyber-insurance, and then find a proper way to
force these formations to evolve.
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3.2 Network Structures
Just like stock markets and airline routes, the cyber-insurance market can be described
using graphs. The structure that will evolve is dependent on all the nodes and how
they connect with each other. The insurer can determine the cost of establishing a
link, and thus determine which nodes will connect to eachother. This is what we will
try to achieve in our models. However, first we need to shed light on what kind of
graph structures that would be desirable to force upon the cyber-insurance market.
To find the proper structure, many different scenarios should be covered. In a
network an agent’s actions are influenced by its neighborhood structure, i.e. the
network connections will affect each individual agent’s payoff, meaning that agents
are dependent on eachother, and the probability of cascading failures are highly
relevant. -If one or more fails, e.g. bankruptcy, failure to deliver at the expected
time, system shut down, higher cost etc, then the whole network will be affected. In
this case there are several types of networks to consider, every social and economic
interaction where an agent’s well-being is dependent on externalities as well as on
his own actions, is a network worth considering.
We found several interesting papers from evolutionary studies and disease epi-
demics, which described characteristics in different graph structures. The ones we
found appropriate, were those which described the benefits of star- and clique-shaped
graphs. These graphs showed characteristics that could be used to make it feasible
for both the insurer to offer - and the customer to acquire insurance.
The paper [LHN05] is about evolutionary dynamics and how some structures
can amplify or sustain evolution and drift1. One aspect of cyber-insurance is risk,
and knowledge of how, for example, viruses spread in a network and how to use
graph structures to prevent both hackers from entering and virus from spreading, is
important. Evolutionary dynamics, and the research of how mutant genes spread
throughout a population, as described in the paper, is analogous to this issue. If we
can determine some structures where certain nodes are advantageous/disadvantageous,
then these structures will have imporant properties, such as sustaining viruses from
spreading, or amplify the incentive for obtaining cyber-insurance.
The paper [LHN05], shows that mutants inserted into a circulation graph, will
have a fixation probability equal to
p1 =
(1− 1r )
(1− 1
rN
)
(3.1)
1Drift is the opposite of selective evolution, it is when the network/structure evolve and change
at random
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Where r represents the relative fitness of the mutant i.e the agents security level,
if it is advantageous it will have a certain chance of fixation, and disadvantageous
mutants will have a chance of extinction. A circulation graph is a graph that satisfies
these two properties:
1. The sum of all edges leaving a vertex is equal for all vertices
2. The sum of all edges entering a vertex is equal for all vertices
A clique is a good example of a circulation graph, and the probability of fixation
is as in Eq. (3.1). The fixation probability determines how probable it is that the
whole network will eventually be "infected" by the mutant. Which means that it
determines the rate of evolution, which relies on both the size of the network and
the evolution speed. If the relative fitness of the nodes is high, then the probability
of fixation will be low. A probability equal to one means that every node in the
network will eventually be affected by the mutant.
An essential part of cyber-insurance is as mentioned earlier, for the insurer to be
able to calculate the overall risk of the instance to be insured. Since the probability
of fixation can be calculated in circulation graphs, if the insurer knows that the
instance is part of a circulation graph, it is possible for the insurer to calculate
the probability of fixation in that network. If we can find graphs with a fixation
probability that exceeds Eq.(3.1) it is even better, because then the insurer is not
only able to calculate the overall probability of fixation, but also to show that the
probability of fixation is higher than the one for circulation graphs. [LHN05] shows
that such graphs exist, and one example is the star topology, (see Figure 3.3). In this
topology the fixation probability is as shown in Eq.(3.2), or more generally Eq.(3.3)2.
p2 =
(1− 1r2 )
(1− 1
r2N )
(3.2)
.
pk =
(1− 1
rk
)
(1− 1
rkN
)
(3.3)
When comparing Eq.(3.1) and Eq.(3.2), we see that the selective difference is amplified
from r to r2, i.e. a star acts as an evolutionary amplifier, favoring advantageous
mutants and inhibiting disadvantageous mutants.
2The parameter k is an amplifier parameter. The star structure is a k = 2 amplifier, and the
super-star, meta-funnel and funnel can all be extended to arbitrarily large k, thereby guaranteeing
fixation of any advantageous mutant [LHN05].
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There are other graphs where the fixation probability is equal to 3.3, examples
are super-stars, such as funnels and metafunnels. These are just more complex
star networks. This paper shows that as N gets large, the super-stars will have a
fixation probability, for an advantageous mutant, that converges to 1, and for a
disadvantageous mutant converges to 0. As exemplified earlier in this chapter, we
know that there are many topologies in our society that are so called scale-free graphs.
These graphs have most of their connectivity clustered in a few vertices, which are
very similar to a network interconnected by multiple stars, these networks can also
be considered as potent selection amplifiers.
The paper [Blu11] present interesting results regarding network formation games.
The authors set up a game where the nodes benefit from direct links, but these links
also expose them to risk. Each node gains a payoff of a per link it establishes, but it
can establish a maximum of δ links. A failure occurs at a node with probability q,
and propagates on a link with probability p. If a node fails, it will receive a negative
payoff of b, no matter how many links it has established. The characteristics of
this game is transferable to how we expect nodes in a cyber-insurance network to
interact with eachother. Therefore, the results of the overall payoff change according
to different collection of participants.
The results from the model presented by Blumen et.al. shows a situation where
clustered graphs achieve a higher payoff when connected to trusted nodes, compared
to when connecting with random nodes. Unlike in anonymous graphs, where nodes
connect to each other at random, nodes in these graphs share some information
with their neighbors, which is used when deciding whether to form a link or not.
Figure 3.3: A star topology.
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To further explain these results, they show that there exists a critical point, called
phase transition, which occurs when nodes have a node degree of 1p . At this point
a node gets a payoff of ap , and to further increase the payoff the node needs to go
into a region with significantly higher failure probability. Because once each node
establishes more than 1p links, the contagious edges will with high probability form a
large cluster, which results in a rise in probability of node failure, and reduces the
overall welfare. From this the paper states that when the minimum welfare exceeds
(1 + f(δ) ∗ ap ) we have reached super-critical payoff. Otherwise it is called sub-critical
payoff. Further Easley et.al, show that the only possible way of ending up with super
critical payoff, is by forming clustered networks consisting of cliques with slightly
more than 1p nodes. However, if the nodes form an anonymous market, by random
linking, they can only get sub-critical payoff. In other words, if the nodes can choose
who they connect with, and by doing so, create trusted clustered markets, they can
achieve a higher payoff by exceeding the critical node degree point.
The paper [GGJ+10] shows how network games evolve when the payoffs are
determined not only by your own decisions, but also by your neighbors. This can
be used to analyze the star network further. The authors analyze a game on public
goods, which is simple but highly relevant for our work. A good example of a public
goods is a security product. A security product suffers from strategic substitutes, i.e.
if your neighbor acquires a security product, you have less incentive to also acquire
the security product. This is because when he acquires it, he gets more secure, and
so do you, due to the positive externalities of the product.
The game is set up like this: We have an action space: X = {0, 1}, where 1 can
be considered as acquiring information, taking vaccine, buying security software etc.
0 is not doing so. Each node i has a set of neighbors: Ni, and a payoff function
yi = xi + x¯Ni. The gross payoff to player i is 1 if yi >= 1 and 0 otherwise. But
each player also suffers from a cost of 0 < c < 1 if he chooses action 1. Looking at
Figure 3.4, we easily see that there are two equilibriums. One where the center node
chooses action 1 and the rest of the nodes choose action 0, and a second equilibrium
where all the leaf nodes choose 1 and the center chooses 0. The overall payoff in
these two differs from eachother, the latter is not socially optimal because it suffers
from a cost equal to: #leafnodes ∗ c, while the other equilibrium only has a total
cost of c. It would have been beneficial if we were able to force the game to always
end up in the socially optimal equilibrium.
From an insurer’s point of view. If an insurance company could identify
these star structures, and force them to end up in the socially optimal equilibrium,
i.e. minimize the overall cost of link establishment, it would have been very beneficial
for both the insurer and the customers. First of all, if the insurer could identify
these structures, he could calculate the overall probability of fixation by a contagions
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(a) Socially Optimal equilibrium,
center node choose action 1
(b) Non Socially Optimal equilib-
rium, leaf nodes choose action 1
Figure 3.4: Figure 3.4a shows the socially optimal equilibrium, and Figure 3.4b
shows the non optimal equilibrium.
node(virus, worm, trojan or other failures). If one could ensure that the center
node is protected, one could also calculate the probability of the contagions node
being extinguished from the network, and possibly being able to ensure that the
network is secure, at least with high probability. One possibility of achieving this
could be by offering very cheap insurance to the leaf nodes, and giving the center
node an incentive to acquire security products by informing the center node about
the probability of failure unless he acquires security, and offer him a decent rebate
if he acquires the security product, and a very expensive insurance if not. In this
way the insurer could force a rational center node into getting both insurance and a
security product, and thus increase the security in the whole network.
This is a simple scenario, analyzing an exogenous network formation, but it
shows how an insurer can force a star network to end up in the social optimal cost
equilibrium. Leading to overall higher security for in the network. We also showed
how the insurer could calculate the probabilities of fixation in circulation, star, funnel,
meta-funnel and super-star graphs. Can the insurer force cyber-insurance networks
to evolve into any of these structures, and at the same time separate the nodes into
trusted and untrusted environments? If so, this could contribute significantly to
solving the problems of cyber-insurance. The problems of information asymmetry and
interdependent risk is reduced. Because, if the insurer knows the network structure,
he can calculate the probabilities of failure and catastrophic events. If the network is
a star and the insurer can ensure that the center node is secure, the interdependent
risk problem is limited to the security of the center node.
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3.3 Research Question
Until now, our thesis has introduced cyber-insurance, presented related work on
the issues regarding cyber-insurance and this chapter has presented the properties
of different graph structures and briefly introduced the idea of network formation.
Generally, the papers in the related work section have presented different models
for solving the problems with cyber-insurance. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the
cyber-insurance market still fails to evolve, despite all the solutions presented in the
different papers. This is why we have chosen to take a different approach. In this
chapter, we have shown some structures, especially the star and clique, which could
generate benefit for both the insurer and customers in a cyber-insurance market.
We will combine the knowledge of these structures and network formation games to
investigate networks consisting of nodes, insured or not, wanting to increase their
payoff by establishing links with eachother. Is it possible for the insurer to force
these networks to evolve endogenously into these structures? We will focus on how
the insurer can determine the resulting formation by adjusting the parameter he can
control, i.e. the insurance cost. We know that if the insurance premium is too high,
no one will buy it. On the other hand, if it is too low, everyone would benefit from
having insurance, and insured nodes will make risky decisions, such as connecting to
risky nodes. We will try to determine whether it is possible to find the intersections,
where the desired structures will evolve, and both the insurer and their customers
will benefit from this.

Chapter4Methodology
4.1 Graphs
As mentioned in the previous chapter, graphs are good analytical tools when studying
complex systems. Since we will use graphs extensively throughout this thesis, it
is important to establish an understanding of basic graph properties. Figure 4.1
depicts the basics of an unweighted graph, where the edges are not assigned any
value. Weighted edges can be useful to e.g. reflect capacity constraints such as a
link’s maximum bandwidth, or the length of a road (edge), but will not be used in
this thesis. Other common definitions used when describing graphs are listed below
[Aud]:
– Edge degree: Number of edges connected with a node.
– Hub: Node with high edge degree.
– Cycle: A chain originating and terminating at the same node.
– Cluster: Subgraph of highly connected nodes.
– Cluster coefficient: Probability for two nodes to be adjacent to a third node.
– Clique: Subgraph where all nodes are adjacent (cluster coefficient = 1).
– Small world graph: Graph with small diameter and large cluster coefficient
(e.g. the Internet and A-B graphs, described in section 4.2).
4.2 Random Graphs
Cyber-insurance covers many fields, from financial transactions and software develop-
ment to computer networks. Many of these fields share a common characteristic, they
can all be described as a graph, and often as a random graph. Therefore, the study
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Figure 4.1: General graph [Aud].
of random graphs is of special concern. The research on random graphs is fairly new
compared to other mathematical discoveries. The first extensive results where found
by Erdös and Rényi in 1959, hence the resulting structures were called E-R graphs.
Later and probably with more accurate results were the work of Albert-Barabási in
1999 [Aud], leading to the characterization of A-B graphs.
Erdös-Rényi Graphs. E-R graphs are networks created between a fixed num-
ber of n-nodes, where each node connects to another of the n−1 nodes with probability
p. The resulting graph will on average contain n(n−1)p2 ≈ n
2p
2 edges [Bol85]. By
analysing the graph, the authors found some interesting properties:
– If p < n−2 then there is no edges in the graph.
– If p = c/n where c is a constant between 1 < c < log n, the graph will provoke
a single large component to grow within the graph.
– If p > (ln n)/n then the graph is completely connected.
– If p = 1/n triangles start forming in the graph.
A fully connected E-R graph will have a short diameter similar to the Internet,
and thus could be a very good description of structures similar to the Internet.
However, the edge degree follows a Poisson distribution, which means that the edge
degrees are peaking around the average value [Aud]. E-R graphs do not capture the
immense clustering coefficient which is present in networks such as the Internet. In
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other words, E-R graphs are not small world graphs, and a different graph structure
is needed to model computer networks. An interesting fact about these graphs is
their vulnerability. These graphs are very vulnerable against random attacks, such
as nature disasters, but robust against directed attacks. Due to the fact that if
you remove all edges from one node, little damage is done, since the network is not
dependent on only a few nodes. Every node has approximately the same node degree,
and it is the sum of all the nodes’ connections that creates the network.
Albert-Barabási Graphs. The structure which is believed to be most accurate
for modelling computer networks are A-B graphs. A-B graphs are different from E-R
graphs since they are scale-free, meaning that the vertices do not have a constant
value throughout the entire graph. Albert and Barabási found that the edge degree
of each vertex follows a power law distribution; meaning that the probability that the
edge degree is g is proportional to g−γ where γ is usually a number between 2 and
3. This distribution is called a thick-tail distribution, because there is a significant
probability that a node may have a very high degree [Aud]. These graphs are in
contrast to E-R-graphs, very vulnerable to directed attacks, because if you take out
a hub, mayor parts of the network will be affected. But the graph is very robust
against random attacks, which is why most of the networks we observe in nature
can be depicted as A-B-graphs. A-B graphs can grow and become scale-free if every
new node is connected to one or more already existing node with a probability
proportional to the edge degree of that node. The paper present an algorithm that
creates A-B graphs and Figure 4.2 shows a graph that evolves from this algorithm:
– A new single vertex is added to the graph.
– This vertex is connected to exactly two other vertices in the graph.
– The probability that the new vertex connects to another vertex is dependent
on the edge degree of the other vertex, higher edge degree meaning higher
probability
– There is only one edge between two vertices.
In addition to the high clustering coefficient Albert-Barabási showed that A-B-
graphs have a fairly small diameter, which can be seen in Figure 4.2. The World
Wide Web, neural networks, scientific referencing, co-authorship and many other
types of networks are very similar to A-B graphs [Aud].
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Figure 4.2: Forming an A-B graph in 15 generations [Aud].
4.3 Game Theory
Here we will present some of the game theory concepts used in our models, for more
thorough explanation of game theory, see: [NRTV07, Wat08].
One shot game. This type of game assumes that players act at the same time
instantly, therefore there is no causality. A game in strategic (normal) form can be
described by three elements:
– the set of players i ∈ I, which we take to be the finite set 1, 2, ...., I.
– the pure-strategy space si ∈ Si for each player i, where si is a possible action
of player i.
– and payoff functions U , which give the players utility functions for each profile
s = (s1, s2, ..., sI) of strategies.
A general solution concept for games of economic interest is the Nash Equilibrium
solution. A Nash Equilibrium is a profile of strategies such that each players strategy
is a best response to the other player’s strategies.
Nash Equilibrium. A pure strategy profile s∗ is a Nash equilibrium if, for all
players i
Ui(s∗i , s∗−i) ≥ Ui(si, s∗−i) ∈ Si (4.1)
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Subgame-perfect equilibrium. A strategy profile s is a subgame perfect
equilibrium if it represents a Nash Equilibrium of every subgame of the original
game.
Socially optimal. A socially optimal outcome is the set of choices that maxi-
mizes the sum of all players’ payoffs.
Price of Anarchy. The price of Anarchy (PoA) of a network game, measures
the efficiency of the network, by comparing the equilibrium outcome with the socially
optimal outcome. The reason for this possible inefficiency is that agents act selfishly
and do not necessarily consider other agents’ payoff when choosing an action. In our
thesis, the price of anarchy will be a number between 0 and 1, where 1 is the socially
optimal outcome.
Stackelberg game. Also known as a leader-follower game, it introduces multi-
ple stages. The leader commits himself first, chooses his strategy, then the followers
respond sequentially. The Stackelberg model can be solved to find the subgame
perfect Nash Equilibrium, i.e. the strategy profile that serves each player best, given
the strategies of the other players and that entails every player playing in a Nash
Equilibrium in every subgame.
Bayesian game. In Bayesian games, information about the other players’
characteristics is incomplete. In these types of games, there is one player(the agent)
who knows both types, and another player (the principal) who does not know the
type of the other player. There are two types of equilibriums in this game: A pooling
equilibrium, is an equilibrium where both types of the agent choose the same action,
i.e. the principal is not able to distinguish the two types. A separating equilibrium
is an equilibrium where the agents of different types choose different actions, and
thus the principal is able to determine the agent’s type by observing his actions.
Pairwise stability. A graph is pairwise stable if:
1. No node wishes to delete a link he is involved in.
2. If there exists a node which wants to add a link, then the node at the other end
of the link does not want to establish this link.
Pairwise stable networks are robust to one-link deviations, where link severance
is unilateral, while link creation is bilateral and under mutual consent of the two
involved players [CAİ09].
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4.4 Netlogo
In addition to analyzing the different models with game theory, we created a simulator
for the models, in a program called Netlogo. Netlogo is a programmable modeling
environment for simulating natural and social phenomena. It is well suited for
modeling complex systems developing over time [Wil]. Netlogo is well suited to
model our complex network formation games, and at the same time Netlogo provided
us with a good graphical user interface that enabled us to see the result of the games,
and also to easily adjust the different parameters. It was especially of use when facing
models that were difficult to analyze, because it gave us a good graphical result,
showing how the network evolved, and the final resulting network. In Figure 4.3 we
see the user interface, which is used to set up the parameters, start the modeling,
and showing the resulting network formation. Figure 4.4 shows how the coding
interface looked like. For detailed overview of the code used in our different models,
see appendix.
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Figure 4.3: The figure shows a screen capture of Netlogo, while we are running one
of our simulations.
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Figure 4.4: The figure shows how the code interface in netlogo looks like.
Chapter5Modeling Cyber-Insurance
There are many examples of nodes that need to establish connections with eachother.
For example, when a firm is outsourcing tasks, cooperating or depending on other
firms in some way. Such scenarios could be modeled, as networks where the nodes
represents the firms and the links between them are their dependencies. However,
the link between nodes involves some risks, such as: will the company deliver at the
reported time, to the reported costs, what happens if it fails to deliver, what if the
company goes bankrupt etc. To handle these risks, we need cyber-insurance.
When deciding whether or not to establish a link to a node, the payoff has to be
higher in the balance between the expected earnings and the risk of the other party
failing to complete the transaction. From the insurer’s point of view, a problem
with cyber-insurance is to define and calculate risk, because the network structure is
undefined. If an insurer were able to predict the network structure, the calculations
of overall risk would be realizable. The situation could be even better if the insurer
could force a chosen robust network structure to evolve, hence, ensuring a higher
total payoff for the network. Examples of such structures are scale-free networks,
stars and cliques, as described in the graph theory chapter. In summary, scale-free
networks have proven to be very robust against random attacks. Star topologies, or
star-like topologies, have a fixation probability that exceeds the fixation probability
of circulation graphs. Star structures also have a desirable property of minimizing the
average path length, i.e. minimizing the cost spent on establishing links. Finally, the
clique has a nice property of being able to achieve super-critical payoff, as showed in
[Blu11]. In our thesis we want to focus on the clique and star/star-like structures for
the following reasons: Both have been identified to have calculable fixation probability
and the possibility of amplifying or suppressing selection and drift. This is favorable,
because if the insurer is able to ensure that the nodes have a certain security level,
particularly the center node, one can prevent viruses from spreading to other nodes.
Model overview. In our models a node is an agent who is either insured or
not, and the nodes’ goal is to maximize its payoff, by establishing links with other
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nodes. Our goal for the models is to find out if and how an insurer can force these
cyber-insurance networks to evolve into the desirable structures found in chapter 3.
In this chapter we will start out with a simple model(model 1: Initial Model)
and stepwise add new features to make the models more realistic and applicable to
real-world scenarios.
An overview of the models can be seen in Figure 5.1. The first model, albeit
unrealistic, shows how the network formation ends up if nodes were able to determine
whether other nodes are insured or not, and insured nodes only choose to connect
to other insured nodes. Model 2 introduces parameters reflecting the actual cyber-
insurance market. This makes the modeling process much more realistic, and we
try to find the conditions where the desired network structures evolve. Model 2b is
a tiny digression, where we analyze the consequences of a node having incomplete
information about the other nodes’ type. In model 3 we apply a bonus when a node
reaches a desired number of connections. This illustrates a scenario where a node is
dependent on other nodes’ expertise in order to complete a task. Model 4 analyzes
the outcome of adding a bulk-insurance discount, which is a normal phenomenon in
the insurance industry, e.g. for each new insurance you purchase, you will receive a
discount. In the final model (model 5: Network externalities and discount), we apply
model 4 to an already existing model: "the symmetric connection game", in order to
analyze the impact of network externalities.
For models 2, 3 and 5, we created a simulator to confirm the results of our
calculations. The interested reader can find the source code in Appendix B.
5.1 Model 1: Initial Model
As a starting point, the model is highly simplified in order to show the concept of
how cyber-insurance can be used to separate insured and non-insured nodes into
two cliques. We assume that every node has complete network information, i.e.
it knows how many nodes that exist, and whether or not they are insured. The
link establishment process is bidirectional, meaning that both nodes must agree to
establish the connection.
For the first model, we assume a set of n nodes that are randomly chosen to be
insured or not, as depicted in Figure 5.2a. They all get their own fixed income, and
by connecting to other nodes, they can increase their payoff. Non-insured nodes will
have a risk of failure, which we model as an expected cost of failure. Therefore, if an
insured node chooses to connect to non-insured nodes it will also suffer this expected
cost of failure. To simplify the decision process, the model follows a rule that only
allows insured nodes to connect to other insured nodes and non-insured nodes can
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Figure 5.1: The figures show an overview of the different models we have created,
and how they relate to each other. For every step, some new features are added to
the model.
only connect with eachother. The resulting graph will be two fully connected cliques,
one consisting of insured nodes and the other of non-insured nodes, as shown in
Figure 5.2b.
This dichotomy represents a trusted environment for the insured nodes, because
the insured nodes know that each node in the clique is also insured against risks. These
nodes will benefit from each connection without having to worry about contagious
risks from the connected nodes. A node in the non-insured clique will also experience
a change in payoff from the links it has established, as each of the links has a
probability of failure. Hence this environment is not trusted, and a link establishment
will always involve some risk.
The first model, although very simple, shows a topology where insured agents
benefit from being insured, and they are candidates to achieve super-critical payoffs
as described in [Blu11].
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(a) 15 Nodes randomly chosen to be either insured
(green) or non-insured (red).
(b) Two clustered networks. One consisting of insured
nodes, the other consisting of non-insured nodes.
Figure 5.2: Shows how nodes connect to eachother according to the model described
in section 5.1.
5.2 Model 2: Including Parameters
The first model is highly simplified and suffers from many limitations, among other
things, it is too simple to reflect the dynamics of a real world scenario, where nodes
will have different variables with different values. To improve the model, we have to
introduce parameters that can be adjusted and reflect real world scenarios. It is fair
to assume that the insured nodes must pay an insurance premium, and this premium
should be dependent on the number of links the node establishes. When two insured
nodes establish a link between eachother, they both have to pay a premium, this is
to make the game more fair, and more realistic. For example, if the two nodes had
different insurance companies, then both companies would charge them for insuring
the link. When a node, insured or not, establish link to a non-insured node, risk
is present. This risk will be represented as an expected risk cost. Logically, if the
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changes in payoff when establishing a link is negative, then no node would want
to establish a link. Thus, nodes will also receive a positive change in payoff when
establishing links to others. Among other things, this reflect the scenario of receiving
benefits from being in a cooperation.
Characteristics of the model. The process of establishing links is a bidirectional
decision. The different parameters are denoted as follows: The insurance premium is
Il, the expected risk cost is represented by r. β represents the benefit of establishing
a link. Table 5.1 presents an overview of the parameters.
β - income from establishing a direct link
Il - increased insurance cost per link the node establishes
r - expected risk cost
Table 5.1: Table showing the parameters used in models 1-4
5.2.1 Two nodes scenario
As a starting point for this model which includes parameters, we consider the simplest
scenario involving only two nodes. In this game the strategy space of both players
consists of four different strategies. A node chooses to be insured or not, and also
chooses whether to establish a link to the other node or not. I.e. the different
strategies are: Be insured and establish link noted as: IL, be insured and not
establish link: IL. Not insured and establish link: IL, and not insured and not
establish link: IL. It should be noted that since the decision to establish a connection
is bidirectional, both have to choose a strategy where they want to establish a link,
for the link establishment to be successful. Hence we end up with the game as shown
in Figure 5.3.
As long as both Il and r are less than β, the only Nash equilibrium in Figure 5.3
is when both nodes choose IL. If we first look at node A, we see that when node
B chooses IL, the best response is IL, because β > β − Il . And since the game is
symmetric, the same holds for node B. When one of the nodes chooses IL, the best
response will be IL, because β − r > β − Il − r, and thus the only Nash equilibrium
is when both nodes play IL.
This means that two nodes will end up in a classic prisoner’s dilemma 1 , where
1The Prisoner’s dilemma was originally framed by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher in 1950.
The dilemma expresses a situation where two players each has two options whose output depends
on the simultaneous choice made by the other. The original dilemma concerns two prisoners who
separately decide whether or not to confess to a crime [Dic]. It is a paradox in decision analysis
which shows why two individuals might not cooperate, even if it is in their best interest to do so.
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the best response is actually worse than the socially optimal. In this case it is trivial
to see that the socially optimal scenario for both nodes is to choose IL, as long as
Il < r. However, the nodes will choose not to buy insurance, since they could risk
ending up in a situation where only one of them pays the cost of insurance, and it is
better to be the one who does not pay.
Introducing time. One possibility for solving this problem where the two
nodes end up choosing not to acquire insurance, is to introduce a leader/follower
game. In this game the players do not act at the same time, but in a given order,
and they can observe the other players’ action. If we consider a game with only
two players, player one first selects strategy, insure or not. Then after observing
this action player two chooses if he would like to insure or not. Then they choose
if they would establish a link or not, in the same order. In this type of game, the
leader will benefit from a first mover advantage, because he can now force the game
in the direction he prefers. This game can be solved by using backward induction
on the extensive form, shown in Figure 5.4, and we find all the different subgame
equilibria. We assume that Eq. (5.1) holds. As we can see from Figure 5.4, when
we have worked our way back to player 1’s first decision, insure or not, we have the
following subgame equilibria:(L1, LI1, LII1 , LIII1 ), (I2, II2 , LI2, LII2 , LIII2 ). This means
that player 1 knows what will happen if he chooses to acquire insurance or not, if he
acquires, he will get payoff: β− Il, if he does not acquire, he gets: β− r. This means
that as long as Il < r, he will chose to acquire insurance, and by doing so forces the
game to end up in an equilibrium where both players acquire insurance and would
like to establish a link.
Il < β and Il > β − r and r < β (5.1)
From this, we see that if the insurance price were set to the right amount, the
first player would choose to purchase insurance and will force the outcome of the
game to be the socially optimal outcome. The problem with this way of solving the
game is that it is very hard to solve for multiple nodes, because the extensive form
game becomes extremely complicated. Additionally we have required that the nodes
act in a given order, which is not a realistic scenario. Hence, we chose not to use a
leader follower game in the other models.
5.2.2 Model 2a: Multiple nodes
Assumptions
To make the modeling possible, we will from now on assume that the type of the
nodes is given in advance, i.e. they are chosen to be insured or non-insured with
a probability. The reason for this is that, we are focusing on endogenous network
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Figure 5.4: Leader follower game, first player 1 chooses to insure or not, then player
2, and then they choose to establish link or not in the same order.
formations, and including this decision process would only drastically increase the
complexity of the models.
The model is now made more realistic by introducing multiple nodes. The
objective of this model is to find characteristic network formations that will evolve
endogenously when the parameters are within certain conditions. For this model
we assume that every node has complete information of the network, i.e. every
node knows the type of the other players. This is a very strong assumption, but
in financial transactions and in cooperative software development networks, it is
reasonable to assume that the parties can acquire this type of information prior to
establishing a financial contract with each other. As we will show in Section 5.2.4,
when we introduce incomplete information between the nodes, it will not be possible
to separate the two types, since they will have to act on beliefs.
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Analysis
As mentioned our goal is to find how and when certain network formations evolve.
We know that if a node can increase its payoff by establishing a link, it will do so.
Thus we can start analyzing the four possible link establishment scenarios, insured
to insured, insured to non-insured, non-insured to insured, and non-insured to non-
insured. Let Ui denote the payoff of a node with degree i, and let Ui+1 be the payoff
a node will receive if it establishes a new link.
Insured to insured. When two insured nodes are considering establishing a
link, they will do so, if and only if both receive a higher payoff. In this scenario the
payoff function of adding a link is as shown in Eq.(5.2).
Ui+1 =
{
β − Il, if i = 0
Ui + β − Il, if i > 0
(5.2)
For a link to be established between two insured nodes, Eq.(5.3) has to hold.
Il < β (5.3)
Non-insured to insured. The payoff a non-insured node receives by connect-
ing to an insured one is as described in Eq.(5.4). As we see this will always be a
positive change in payoff, and thus a non-insured node will always choose to connect
to an insured node.
Ui+1 =
{
β, if i = 0
Ui + β, if i > 0
(5.4)
Insured to non-insured. The payoff an insured node receives in this scenario
is as follows:
Ui+1 =
{
β − Il − r, if i = 0
Ui + β − Il − r, if i > 0
(5.5)
For this to happen Eq.(5.6) has to hold, since a non-insured node always wants to
connect to an insured one, this is the only condition that is needed for this scenario
to happen.
Il + r < β (5.6)
Non-insured to Non-insured. The payoff a non-insured nodes receives when
connecting to another non-insured node is as follows:
Ui+1 =
{
β − r, if i = 0
Ui + β − r, if i > 0
(5.7)
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For this link-establishment scenario to happen Eq.(5.8) has to hold.
β > r (5.8)
Forming a trusted clique. We want to find the conditions for when different
network structures will evolve. One desired structure would be to form a trusted
clique of only insured nodes, in order to reduce risk and for the nodes to receive
super-critical payoff. For this to happen, all insured nodes must connect to each
other, i.e. Eq.(5.3) has to hold. Additionally, we need to ensure that insured nodes
do not establish links to non-insured nodes. i.e. the following has to hold:
Il + r > β (5.9)
This gives us the limitation shown in Eq.(5.10) on the insurance link cost.
β − r < Il < β (5.10)
This condition means that if the link insurance cost is between the two boundaries,
all the insured nodes will connect with each other, and no other nodes. If the link
insurance cost is greater than β, then no insured node will establish any links. And if
it is below β− r, then the insured nodes will also connect to the non-insured ones. It
should also be noticed that as long as r < β, then the non-insured nodes will connect
to eachother.
5.2.3 Result and findings
From the analysis we found different conditions for the link establishment process. If
Eq.(5.10) is fulfilled, then the network will end up with one clique of only insured
nodes. The non-insured nodes will end up in another clique if the risk of connecting
to another non-insured node is less than the benefit of establishing the link (r < β).
If the link insurance cost and risk of connecting to non-insured nodes is less than
the benefit (Il + r < β), then insured nodes will also connect to non-insured nodes.
Hence the network will end up in one giant clique.
These findings are independent of the number of players, because we only consider
one link at a time, and the change in payoffs is linear and independent of the nodes
degree.
Stability and efficiency. When measuring stability in this model, it is easily
seen that since the change in payoff when adding links is linear, and non-dependent
on the nodes degree, the resulting network will be pairwise stable. It also follows from
the definition of a Nash equilibrium, that the resulting network is an equilibrium,
since every player has best responded to the other players’ best responses, and no
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node can increase its payoff by single-handedly changing a strategy. To calculate the
efficiency we need to sum up the overall payoff, and compare it to the maximum
possible payoff, i.e. we want to find the price of anarchy. The total payoff can be
calculated as in Eq.(5.11), where
∑
I × I represents the sum of payoffs achieved
from links between insured nodes.
∑
I × I is the sum of payoffs achieved from links
between non-insured and insured, and
∑
I × I is the sum of payoffs achieved from
links between non-insured and non-insured nodes.
Utotal =
∑
I × I +
∑
I × I +
∑
I × I (5.11)
When the parameters are inserted in Eq.(5.11), we get Eq.(5.12), where NI and NI ,
represent the number of insured and non-insured nodes in the network.
Utotal = NI(NI − 1)(β − Il) +NI(NI − 1)(β − r) +NINI(2β − r − Il) (5.12)
If we calculate the overall payoff for a network with one clique of insured and another
with non-insured, i.e. Eq. (5.10) and r < β hold. The total payoff is as shown in
Eq.(5.13).
Utotal = NI(NI − 1)(β − Il) +NI(NI − 1)(β − r) (5.13)
However, this is not the socially best outcome, because there are no links between
insured and non-insured nodes, which would have contributed with 2β − r − Il for
every link, and since 2β > r + Il will be true, as long as both the insurance cost
and the expected risk cost is less than β. Thus, the socially best outcome would
have been one clique, with both insured and non-insured nodes. The formula for
calculating the price of anarchy is shown in Eq.(5.14).
PoS =
NI(NI − 1)(β − Il) +NI(NI − 1)(β − r)
NI(NI − 1)(β − Il) +NI(NI − 1)(β − r) +NINI(2β − r − Il)
(5.14)
An interesting thing to notice is that the only scenario where the insurer is able to
separate the two types of nodes, and at the same time ensuring an efficient and stable
outcome, is when there are only links between insured nodes, or between non-insured
nodes, or no links at all. This can only happen when 2β < Il + r, and Il > β + β − r
or r > β + β − Il or if both Il and r is larger than β.
Simulation of the results
To verify that our calculations of the network formation were consistent with the
assumptions, we performed different simulations using NetLogo. In the simulator
a node is insured with a probability p. The network formation is performed by
selecting two random nodes, not neighbors, then both nodes check whether they
would prefer to establish a link or not. The rules are as described earlier; when a node
is considering establishing a link it chooses to do so if the payoff received is larger
than the payoff it already has achieved, and the decision is bilateral. This selection
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is repeated until the network is fully connected or no more nodes are willing to
establish new links. By selecting nodes at random and checking if both of them would
like to connect to each other, we relax the assumption of full network information,
because now nodes only get to know if another node is insured or not, when they
ask eachother.
(a) Ten nodes randomly, with probability 0.5, chosen to be either insured (green) or
non-insured (red).
(b) Two clustered fully connected networks. One consisting of insured nodes the other
consisting of non-insured nodes. The link establishment is done by following the rules
described above
Figure 5.5: The figure shows the resulting network from a simulation with parameters:
β = 0.9, Il = r = 0.5.
In Figure 5.5 we see the result of a simulation with the parameters: β = 0.9,
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Il = r = 0.5. With these parameters Eq.(5.10) holds, and r < β. Thus the network
formation game ends up in two cliques, one with insured nodes and another with
non-insured nodes. The result is shown in Figure 5.5b, and confirms our calculations.
The price of anarchy in this scenario is: PoA = 815 . In this figure only n = 10 nodes
are included, this is done to make the figure readable and easy to understand. Similar
results were obtained when performing the simulation with larger values of n, but
the resulting printouts included to many nodes and links to be readable.
In the next simulations, the parameters were chosen to violate Eq.(5.10). The
result can be seen in Figure 5.6. In figure 5.6a we see that when Il < β− r, the result
is one clique of both insured and non-insured nodes, and the price of anarchy is 1,
i.e. this is the socially optimal outcome. In figure 5.6b the insurance cost is Il > β,
and as we see only non-insured nodes connect to eachother, because the insurance
cost per link is higher than the benefit given from connecting to a new node, i.e. the
insured ones choose not to establish any connections. The price of anarchy in this
scenario is: PoA = 3235 , and is thus close to the socially optimal outcome.
5.2.4 Model 2b: Incomplete information
Although we previously mentioned that we chose to assume complete information
about other nodes’ type. We wanted to get an impression of the complexity when
modeling a scenario where some nodes’ lack information about the other nodes type.
The way we model this is by letting nature select whether a player is insured or not, a
node is insured with probability p, and not insured with probability 1− p. All nodes
know their own type, but in the link establishment process only one node knows
the type of the other. The other node only knows the probability of the other node
being insured or not. We want to see if it is possible for the nodes with incomplete
information to distinguish an insured node from a non-insured one. For this model
we will only present the results from the analysis, because the mathematics and
analysis is too complex and non-intuitive to include here. The actual analysis and
the mathematics of this game can be seen in appendix A.1.
Result and findings. When one player lacks knowledge about the other player,
we were only able to find two scenarios where the player with less information could
separate the two types of the other node. The first scenario occur when player 2 is
insured and β < Il, then it is only the non-insured node who wishes to establish a
link, and in this way player 2 is able to separate the two types of player 1. However,
since the benefit is less than the cost( β < Il), his best response is to not establish
any link.
The other scenario where the node with incomplete information is able to separate
the two types of player 1, is when he is not insured and the following is true:
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(a) Ten nodes insured with probability 0.5, the parameters where: β = 0.9, Il = 0.3
and r = 0.5, i.e. the link insurance cost, Il, is violating the condition in Eq.(5.10),
and the resulting network is one clique of both insured and non-insured nodes.
(b) Ten nodes insured with probability 0.5, with parameters as before, except for
the link insurance cost: Il = 0.95. This resulted in a clique of only non-insured
nodes.
Figure 5.6: The figure shows the two possible scenarios that violate Eq.(5.10), 5.6a
shows the result when Il < β − r and 5.6b shows the result when Il > β.
r < β < Il + r. In this scenario it is only the non-insured node who would want to
establish a link. Thus, in this scenario the game will end up with a link between two
non-insured nodes.
We were also able to find some pooling equilibriums. If the node with incomplete
information is insured, a link will be established if the following is true: β+rp−r > Il.
However, if Il < β but Il > β + rp− r, then the pooling equilibrium will be: node 1
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wants to establish link, but node 2 rejects. There is also a pooling equilibrium where
both nodes want to establish a link, this occurs when node 2 is not insured and the
following is true: β − Il > r. If the benefit from establishing a link is less than the
expected risk cost( β < r), there will be a pooling equilibrium where both players
choose not to establish links.
What this shows us is that when one player has incomplete information, it is
no longer possible for the insurer to force a network to evolve into a state where a
clique of only insured nodes exists. Furthermore, the incentive for establishing links
decreases, since the player with less information must act on beliefs. We chose not
to simulate this model, since the result would only be a clique of non-insured nodes
or a giant clique consisting of both insured and non-insured nodes. In all the other
models complete network information is assumed.
5.3 Model 3: Including maximum node degree and bonus
In real world networks, such as in the manufacturing industry, software development
firms and many other types of business, in some scenarios a product can usually not
be completed without outsourcing some of the work needed. For the manufacturer,
it could be beneficial to buy certain parts from others instead of producing them
on his own. A software product might need the combined knowledge from different
firms. Thus the firm that outsources tasks is dependent on the other firms, and
will not reach its goal before the other firms deliver their contribution. When the
product is finished the company gets paid. To model this scenario we introduce a
maximum node degree, m, per node, which represents the number of partners needed
to complete a task. Additionally a bonus γ represents the payoff a node receives
when m links are established. Except from this, the game is unchanged.
5.3.1 Analysis
This model is very similar to the earlier models: for nodes to connect to each other,
the change in payoff still has to be positive: Ui+1 > Ui. However, we also need to
consider the bonus received when reaching the maximum node degree, m. To model
this, we add the possible bonus divided on the number of links required to reach the
bonus( γm−i ) in the decision process every time a node is considering to establish a
link. In this way the model will change from the earlier models, because now the
nodes have more incentive to connect to other nodes, and for every step closer to the
goal, the nodes are more willing to accept risk than before. For example, an insured
node is more likely to accept a risky link when it only needs one more link to reach
the goal, compared to when it need several more links to reach the goal.
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The model now introduces a risk factor, because it is not certain that the nodes
will obtain enough links, and if not, they will not receive their bonus, and they are
stuck with their already established connections.
To analyze this model, let us take a closer look at the four different scenarios of
the game. When establishing a link between two insured nodes, the payoff the nodes
will receive is as described in Eq.(5.15).
Ui+1 =

β − Il, if i = 0
Ui + β − Il, if i > 0
Ui + β − Il + γ, if i = m− 1
(5.15)
As described earlier we need to include the possibility of reaching the goal in the
decision, and thus for insured nodes to connect to each other, Eq.(5.16) has to hold.
Ui + β − Il + γ
m− i > Ui
β − Il + γ
m− i > 0
→ β + γ
m− i > Il (5.16)
The payoff an insured node receives when connecting to a non-insured node is as
follows:
Ui+1 =

β − Il − r, if i = 0
Ui + β − Il − r, if i > 0
Ui + β − Il − r + γ, if i = m− 1
(5.17)
To establish a connection from an insured node to a non-insured one, the following
has to hold:
Ui + β − Il − r + γ
m− i > Ui
β − Il − r + γ
m− i > 0
→ β + γ
m− i − r > Il (5.18)
When a non-insured node connects to another non-insured node, this is the payoff
they both will receive:
Ui+1 =

β − r, if i = 0
Ui + β − r, if i > 0
Ui + β − r + γ, if i = m− 1
(5.19)
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To establish the connection, the following equation has to hold:
Ui + β − r + γ
m− i > Ui
β − r + γ
m− i > 0
→ β + γ
m− i > r (5.20)
In the case of a non-insured node wanting to establish a link with an insured node,
the payoff is a strictly increasing function, see Eq.(5.21), and thus a non-insured
node will always connect to an insured node if possible.
Ui+1 =

β, if i = 0
Ui + β, if i > 0
Ui + β + γ, if i = m− 1
(5.21)
5.3.2 Result and findings
If we want a clique of only insured nodes, we have to ensure that insured nodes
connect to each other, and that they do not establish connections to non-insured
nodes. We know that an insured node would want to connect to another insured
node if Eq.(5.16) is satisfied. In the equation we see that the expected bonus per
established link is increasing. Thus, if an insured node of degree zero is willing to
connect to another insured node, then every insured node with a degree higher than
zero would also like to connect to another insured node. To ensure that insured
nodes connect to eachother this equation has to hold:
β + γ
m
> Il (5.22)
We also want to ensure that insured nodes never establish links with non-insured
nodes, from Eq.5.17 we see that this has to hold:
β + γ
m− i − r < Il (5.23)
This can be simplified, if one can ensure that the most risk willing insured node, i.e.
the node with degree m− 1, does not establish links with non-insured nodes. Then
we know that no insured node with degree less than m− 1 will establish links with
non-insured nodes. From this we get equation Eq.(5.24).
β + γ
m− (m− 1) − r < Il
→ β + γ − r < Il (5.24)
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To summarize, Eq.(5.22) and Eq.(5.24) give the final limitation on the link
insurance cost, Eq.(5.25). If this equation is satisfied, the resulting network will
contain a clique of only insured nodes.
β + γ − r < Il < β + γ
m
(5.25)
For this to even be possible, β + γ − r < β + γm , i.e. Eq.(5.26) has to hold. This
equation reflects that as the risk to bonus ratio gets smaller, it gets more and more
difficult to ensure a clique of only insured nodes. When the risk to bonus ratio is
less than 1− 1m , a clique will never occur. The equation shows that a node would be
more and more willing to take a risk, as the reward of doing so increases.
γ − r < γm
1− r
γ
< 1m
→ 1− 1
m
< rγ (5.26)
It is also useful to know when non-insured nodes connect to each other. This
happens when Eq.(5.19) is satisfied. This equation is dependent on the node degree,
and thus for the first link to be established from a non-insured node, the expected
payoff has to be higher than the risk(β + γm > r). If the risk is too high, then the
non-insured node must establish links with insured nodes before it could be willing
to establish risky links.
With these findings, an insurer can determine the outcome of the network for-
mation game by adjusting the insurance cost parameter. If he wants a clique of
only insured nodes Eq.(5.25) has to hold. However, it is easy to relax the condition,
so that insured nodes only connect to, j = 1, 2, 3..m non-insured nodes. This is
done by changing Eq.(5.24) to β + γm−(m−j) − r < Il, which gives us Eq.(5.27). An
interesting result in this model is that due to the risk willingness among the nodes,
the lower boundary, to ensure separation of insured and non-insured nodes, of the
link insurance cost is higher compared to the one found in model 2.
Consequences of not reaching the required number of edges. When a
node establishes a link, it does not know whether it will reach the maximum node
degree, unless the current node degree is m− 1. Hence the node might end up not
reaching the desired goal. This can happen if there is not enough nodes willing to
establish links. Consequently, nodes who do not reach their goal could end up with a
payoff less than U0.
β + γ
j
− r < Il (5.27)
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Efficiency and Stability. In this model, the incentive for establishing links is
increased compared to model 2. Thus, to maintain a stable network with two cliques
the cost of link establishment has to be increased. This increased incentive may
result in a higher price of stability, but if every node has received its bonus, then the
price of anarchy is 1. The price of anarchy is dependent on the number of nodes in
both cliques, and whether its enough nodes for everyone to reach their maximum
degree or not. If there are nodes that have not reached their maximum degree in
both cliques, then the resulting network is not necessarily the most efficient, and we
could be missing a potential payoff due to the cost constraint.
By introducing the maximum degree m we are limiting the problem of price of
anarchy, because as long as m is less than the number of insured and number of
non-insured nodes, there will be less links established compared to model 2, and
overall fewer possible links between insured and non-insured. However, the bonus the
nodes receive will contribute to inefficiency, because when nodes do not reach their
maximum degree, the potential payoff that could be generated by allowing insured
and non-insured nodes to connect, is greater than in model 2.
Simulation of the results
For the first simulation the parameters are set to the following: β = 0.9, Il = 0.7, r =
0.5, γ = 0.2 and m = 4, in order to satisfy condition Eq.(5.25), and enable all nodes
to reach their maximum degree.
Figure 5.7: Two cliques, one consisting of insured agents the other consists of
non-insured. All nodes have reached their goal.
As we see in Figure 5.7, the results were as expected, the cost of insuring a
link satisfied the conditions found earlier, and thus the result was two cliques, one
consisting of only insured nodes and the other of non-insured nodes. An interesting
observation is that β and r is the same as in model 2, but to ensure that only insured
nodes connect to eachother, the link insurance cost had to be higher. This is to
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compensate for the risk the nodes now are willing to take. The price of anarchy in
this scenario is 1, i.e. the socially optimal outcome.
In the second simulation we set the parameter m = 5, and kept the other variables
unchanged. The resulting network was as expected the same as in the last simulation,
but since the nodes did not reach their maximum degree, the price of anarchy is less
than one. The price of anarchy can be seen in Eq.(5.28).
PoA = Sum of payoffsSum of Socially optimal payoffs
PoA = 5×4×(0.9−0.7)+5×4×(0.9−0.5)5×4×(0.9−0.7)+5×4×(0.9−0.5)+5×(2×0.9−0.7−0.5+2×0.2)
PoA = 1217 (5.28)
When we changed the link insurance cost, and set it to the same value as in
model 2, Il = 0.5, the resulting networks change. Now we found that the insured
nodes are willing to establish risky links to reach their maximum degree. Some of
the resulting networks can be seen in Figure 5.8. In figure 5.8a the price of anarchy
is 0.95, and in figure 5.8b the price of anarchy is 1, i.e. it has reached the socially
optimal outcome.
5.4 Model 4: Including bulk insurance discount
Insurance companies often give a quantum discount when a customer purchases
multiple products. From convenience stores, we are used to the slogan "buy one
get one for free", and insurers tend to follow the same marketing strategy. It seems
to be common for insurance companies to offer discount to their customers if the
customers choose to combine some or all of their insurances with them. Several
insurance companies in Norway, e.g. Sparebank 1 offers customers up to 25 %
discount according to the following rules [Spa].
– 10% discount if the person has signed three different insurances
– 15% discount if the person has signed four different insurances
– 20% discount if the person has signed five or more different insurances
– Plus additional 5% discount if the person is a customer of the bank.
The insurance offered is intended for the individual market and includes among
other things: travel insurance, household insurance, car insurance, house insurance,
insurance of valuable items and yacht insurance.
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(a) One non-insured node has connected to two insured nodes.
(b) Every non-insured node is connected to one insured node, this is the optimal
outcome with these parameters.
Figure 5.8: Two possible outcomes when insured nodes are willing to take the risk
of connecting to non-insured nodes, to receive their bonus. Figure a shows a scenario
where one non-insured node has connected to more than one insured node, thus not
a socially optimal outcome. Figure b shows the optimal outcome.
Inspired by these kinds of discounts on insurance products, we would like to
introduce a discount rate dependent on the degree of the node. In a real-world
scenario where nodes have an option of acquiring insurance or not, this will make it
more attractive for nodes with high degree to acquire insurance, and the discount
could act as an incentive for other nodes to also acquire insurance. Therefore, this
seems like a reasonable model to include. Since, if you have many links, you will pay
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less per link compared to a node having fewer links.
How insurance companies choose to formulate their discount rate might vary.
One solution might be to follow a strict 5% discount per new connection, similar to
the one from Sparebank 1, or let the discount follow a power law, or a log-function
etc. We choose to follow a discount rule which directly reflects the node’s degree.
5.4.1 Analysis
The price for adding a new link follows the equation:
Il
i+ 1 (5.29)
Here, i is the node’s current degree. This means that the more links a node establishes
the cheaper the link insurance will be.
Discount model
We start our analysis by applying the discount to model 2. As before we analyze the
four different connection scenarios. However, because non-insured nodes do not pay
any insurance, it is only the scenario where insured nodes connects to other insured
nodes and insured nodes connect to non-insured nodes, that has changed compared
to model 2.
When we consider links between insured nodes, we must add the discount to
the conditions found in model 2. The condition for establishing links between two
insured nodes is shown in Eq.(5.30).
Il
i+ 1 < β (5.30)
For a link between insured and non-insured nodes to be established, Eq.(5.31)
has to hold.
Il
i+ 1 + r < β (5.31)
Result and findings For an insurer to be able to guarantee that the network
ends up in a clique with only insured nodes, we must ensure that the most expensive
link establishment, i.e. the first, to another insured node can be achieved. This gives
us the same condition as in model 2, i.e. Il < β. We also need to ensure that insured
nodes do not connect to non-insured nodes, thus we get the final condition in Eq.
(5.32), where NI is the number of insured nodes in the network.
(NI)(β − r) < Il < β (5.32)
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This condition is very strong, because for it to be possible the following has to
hold:β − r < βNI , and as the number of insured nodes gets higher this gets more and
more unlikely. Thus by including bulk discount, the insurer is making it harder for
himself to constrain the network formation. The reason for this is that the incentive
for establishing links is higher than without discount, and therefore more links will
be established.
Stability and efficiency If we compare the total payoff equation in this model,
see Eq.(5.33), with the one in model 2 (Eq.(5.12)), we see that the cost for insured
nodes has changed, and therefore the payoff achieved from links between insured
nodes has increased, and so has the payoff received from potential links between
insured and non-insured nodes. As we know, in a scenario where the insurer sets the
cost, in a manner that makes the network end up in two cliques, the payoff received
from links between insured and non-insured is zero. The potential payoff in a scenario
where there are two cliques can be described like this: (NINIβ +NI(−
∑N
I
−1
i=NI
Il
i )),
and as long as (NINIβ > NI(−
∑N
I
−1
i=NI
Il
i )) it would have been socially optimal
to have a single clique of both insured and non-insured nodes. When the cost of
establishing links decreases and the insurer forces the network formation to end up in
two cliques, the price of anarchy will be higher compared to the price of anarchy in
model 2. The reason for this is that the incentive for establishing links has increased,
and thus for the insurer to be able to constrain the network formation, the cost of
establishing links has to be higher.
Utotal = (NI(NI−1)β−NI
NI−1∑
i=1
Il
i
)+(NI(NI−1)(β−r))+(NINIβ+NI(−
N
I
−1∑
i=NI
Il
i
))
(5.33)
Discount and Bonus model
We also need to apply the discount to model 3. Still, the only scenarios that has
changed in this model is the ones where insured nodes connects to other insured
nodes or when insured nodes connects to non-insured nodes.
When insured nodes are considering to establish links with eachother, their payoff
functions are as shown in Eq.(5.34).
Ui+1 =

β − Il, if i = 0
Ui + β − Ili+1 , if i > 0
Ui + β − Ili+1 + γ, if i = m− 1
(5.34)
For insured nodes to connect to eachother Eq.(5.35) has to hold.
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Ui + β − Il
i+ 1 +
γ
m− i > Ui
β − Il
i+ 1 +
γ
m− i > 0
→ β + γ
m− i >
Il
i+1 (5.35)
When insured nodes are considering to connect to non-insured nodes, their payoff
functions are as shown in Eq. (5.36).
Ui+1 =

β − Il − r, if i = 0
Ui + β − Ili+1 − r, if i > 0
Ui + β − Ili+1 − r + γ, if i = m− 1
(5.36)
For this to happen Eq.(5.37) has to hold.
Ui + β − Il
i+ 1 +
γ
m− i − r > Ui
→ β + γ
m− i > r +
Il
i+1 (5.37)
5.4.2 Result and findings
We analyze the same scenario as in the other models, namely a clique of only insured
nodes. The first step is to guarantee that insured nodes connect to eachother. To
ensure that this happens, we need to find the condition for the lowest expected
increase in payoff, i.e. at node degree zero. If nodes are willing to establish links at
this point, then they will also be willing at all degrees higher than zero. At degree
zero there is no discount on the insurance link cost, and thus if Eq.(5.22) from model
3 holds, insured nodes will connect to other insured nodes.
The condition for guaranteeing that insured nodes do not connect to non-insured
nodes has changed, we know that if an insured node does not want to establish a
link with a non-insured node at degree m − 1, then neither will any insured node
with degree lower than m− 1 do so. From this we find the condition in Eq.(5.38)
Ui + β − Il
m
+ γ
m− (m− 1) − r < Ui
β + γ − r < Ilm
→ m(β + γ − r) < Il
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This is a very strong condition, because the only way this can happen is if β+γ−r < 1m .
This shows us that when the incentives for establishing links increase, it gets more
and more difficult for the insurer to guarantee a clique of only insured nodes. The
final condition for ensuring a clique of only insured nodes is shown in Eq.(5.38).
m(β + γ − r) < Il < β + γ
m
(5.38)
The quantum discount results in an overall higher payoff for the insured nodes,
since the cost of insuring a new link becomes cheaper. This means that the insured
nodes will have a higher incentive to create links, making it harder for the insurer to
separate insured and non-insured nodes.
We see that the problem of separating the two node types have increased compared
to model 3, meaning that if we have a network where the insurer has managed to
separate them, the price of anarchy is also higher compared to a similar scenario in
model 3.
5.5 Model 5: Network externalities and discount
In the earlier models, the experienced network effects arose only from a node’s
neighbours. I.e. when a node established a connection the change in utility were
only dependent on fixed variables, and not dependent on the rest of the network. In
many real world scenarios it is more realistic that a node will be strongly affected
by the indirect connections to other nodes. Social relationships between nodes are
good examples of such networks, where each person offer benefits in terms of favors,
information etc.
We apply the results from the paper from Jackson and Wolinsky [JW96] and use
a network formation game found in [Jac05] to study indirect network effects in our
model.
The benefits a player receives in this game are calculated as follows: In addition
to the benefit from the direct connection, a node will also benefit from "friends of
the friend", and "friends of the friends of the friend" etc. This is achieved by letting
the payoff be calculated relative to the distance between the nodes. β now depends
on the minimum number of hops to the node, e.g. the benefit of a direct connection
is β, the benefit of a friend of a friend is β2 etc. We want the benefit to decrease
with distance, therefore we need the limitation: 0 < β < 1.
Example: Let us consider the network shown in 5.9. Node 1 and node 4 in
the network will receive a benefit of β + β2 + β3 by being connected with nodes 2
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Figure 5.9: Four nodes interconnected with each other.
and 3. β2 + β3 represents the indirect benefits from nodes 3 and 4. Nodes 2 and 3
receive a benefit of β + β + β2. For this network to make sense, it is important to
also include some cost of having direct connections, or else the rational thing would
be to establish a link with everyone. This is done as in earlier models, every node
pays a cost for direct connections, but no cost for indirect connections. Thus the
total payoff for a node is:
∑
j 6=i
β
d(ij)
ij −
∑
j:ij∈g
cij , (5.39)
Where d(ij) represents the shortest path between node i and node j, and cij
represents node i’s cost of establishing a link between the two nodes. To simplify
the model we choose a symmetric connection process where β and c is set to a fixed
global value.
In the paper [JW96], the authors analyze the networks with two different ap-
proaches, one with focus on efficiency and the other on stability. The optimal network
is of course both efficient and stable, but as we shall see there are some conflicts
between efficiency and stability. Matthew, et.al. showed that an efficient network is:
1. a complete graph gN if c < β − β2,
2. a star encompassing every node if β − β2 < c < β + (N−2)2 β2,
3. an empty network (no links) if β + (N−2)2 β2 < c.
The most efficient structure is a star structure which encompasses every node.
A star structure has the characteristics of minimizing the average path length and
uses the minimum number of links (N − 1) required for including every node. This
structure provides the highest overall payoff for the network, but this network is not
necessarily stable.
5.5. MODEL 5: NETWORK EXTERNALITIES AND DISCOUNT 61
When analyzing the stability of the network, by using the definition of pairwise
stability, Jackson and Wolinsky found four different stability conditions:
1. a pairwise stable network consists of at most one (non-empty) component,
2. if c < β − β2, the unique pairwise stable network will be a complete graph gN ,
3. if β − β2 < c < β, a star encompassing every node will be pairwise stable,
although not necessarily the unique pairwise stable graph,
4. if β < c, any pairwise stable network which is nonempty is such that each
player has at least two links and is thus inefficient.
We see that stability condition 2 is the same as efficiency condition 1, and therefore if
this condition is fulfilled, the network is both stable and efficient. Condition 3 shows
us why the efficient star network is not necessarily stable. If β ≤ c < β + (N−2)2 β2
then the efficient network will be a star, but it is not stable.
It should be noticed that it is more beneficial for a node to operate as a leaf node
compared to being a center node, due to the cost of direct connections. In a star
structure, a leaf node will only have to pay the cost of the link to the center node,
and will benefit indirectly for each node connected to the center node. The center
node will benefit from each new connection, but, the payoff will only be β − c for
each connection.
5.5.1 Insurance and connection game
The findings about efficiency and stability are very useful for our model, because
if one has knowledge of the different variables it is possible to determine how the
network will evolve. Additionally, if you are able to control the variables, you can
actually determine the resulting network structure. From the referenced papers,
we know that different boundaries on the link cost exists, and how the resulting
stable and efficient network will be. Our earlier models show that the cost of
establishing a link is the insurance cost and/or the risk cost. From this we can
show that if β − β2 < Il < β and r > β, a star with only insured nodes, and no
connections between non-insured nodes, is both a stable and an efficient network. If
β−β2 < Il + r < β and β−β2 < Il and β−β2 < r, the stable and efficient network
is a star consisting of both insured and non-insured nodes. If Il < β − β2 all insured
nodes will connect to every other insured node, and if r < β − β2 all non-insured
nodes will connect to every other non-insured node. In addition if r+ Il < β−β2 the
resulting network will be a clique of both insured and non-insured nodes. The insurer
can thus determine the formation of the network by adjusting the cost parameters.
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5.5.2 Homogeneous symmetric connection game
From this point on, the game we will consider is a homogeneous network setting,
where every node is considered to be insured. This is done because it will simplify
an otherwise very complex model. We are analyzing the resulting network structure,
which is easier when only considering one homogeneous cost for every node. Let us
look at an example, where the parameters are set to: β = 0.9, Il = 0.5. The resulting
network from a simulation is shown in Figure 5.10.
Figure 5.10: The resulting network after a simulation with the parameters β =
0.9, Il = 0.5.
As we see this is not an efficient star, but the network is stable. The efficient
network would be to delete the link 4, 6 and adding the link 1, 6. But since we only
consider one link at a time this can not be done. To show this let Ui denote the
payoff of node i, the payoffs of the nodes are as described in Eq.(5.40).
U1 = 4β + β2 − 4c
U2 = U3 = U5 = β + 3β2 + β3 − c
U4 = 2β + 3β2 − 2c
U6 = β + β2 + 3β3 − c (5.40)
Node 6 would benefit from adding the link 1, 6, but node 1 is not willing to do so,
because then it must pay an extra cost, and since β2 > β − c, the network is stable,
but not efficient.
From this we see that, even when the most efficient and stable network is a star,
we can not guarantee that the network formation game will end up in a star. This is
because we only consider one link at a time, and not the whole network.
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A star is not possible with high n. In the paper [Jac05] the authors came
up with the following proposition: Consider the symmetric connections model in the
case where β − β2 < c < β. As the number of nodes grows, the probability that a
stable state (under the process where each link has an equal probability of being
identified) is reached with the efficient network structure of a star goes to zero. But
if a network reaches the efficient star structure, it is also pairwise stable, and will
remain a star. We confirmed this when running multiple simulations. When we used
few nodes the resulting network often became a star, but as the number of nodes
increased the network rarely became a star.
However, the structure of the networks that evolve is very similar to a scale-free
network. There are many nodes with low node degree, and few with a high node
degree. One example of this is shown in Figure 5.11. There are only ten nodes, but
the network has the properties of a scale-free network. Two nodes have a degree of 4,
and the rest have a degree of one or two.
Figure 5.11: The resulting network after a simulation with the parameters described
earlier and 10 nodes.
Bulk insurance. As noted before it is not preferable to be the center node,
due to the cost of all the direct links. In a model with bulk insurance discount, the
extra cost for the center node would decrease significantly. This could be used to
increase the probability of reaching a star formation.
Using the discount formula from the previous model, we end up with Eq.(5.41)
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to achieve an efficient and stable star topology. i represents the node degree.
β − β2 < il
i+ 1 < β (5.41)
An interesting property of the discount model is that the conditions for efficient and
stable networks will change. Because when the node degree increases, the insurance
cost might reach the critical degree g, and the best strategy for a node with degree g
or higher, is to connect to every node, as shown in Eq.(5.42). The critical degree
occurs when a node’s optimal strategy changes from relaying on indirect connections
to connecting to every node.
Il
g
< β − β2 (5.42)
This is possible when g < n, where n represents the number of nodes in the network.
The stability condition has changed for a node with a critical degree. The stable
and efficient condition for this node is, as shown earlier, to have a direct connection
to every other node. Thus if we have a star topology, both the leaf nodes and the
center node are stable, and the center node has been compensated for its role in the
network.
Since the networks formed are similar to scale-free networks, we can calculate the
probability of a node having degree g, see Eq.(5.43). γ is the power law parameter,
as described in Chapter 4.
P (g) = g−γ (5.43)
When a node i reaches the critical degree g its optimal strategy is to connect to every
node, since the payoff generated from direct connections is larger than any indirect
connection. In general, nodes prefer to connect to nodes with high connectivity2,
and will thus prefer to connect to this node compared to nodes with a degree lower
than g. In this way, nodes will connect to the node who has a degree greater than or
equal to g, and remove the links to their low-degree nodes which they can instead
reach through the node with high connectivity.
Let us consider a case with n nodes, and two of these nodes, i and j, have an
equal degree larger than g. The rest of the nodes have a degree of one or zero. If
there exists a node with degree zero, it would prefer to be connected to i or j, and
so will i and j, so this will eventually happen. If a node connected to i is considering
connecting to j, or vice versa, it will do so because j can offer a higher connectivity
than i. Now j has a higher degree than i, and thus every node would prefer to
connect to j over i. This will eventually result in a star formation, with j as the
center node. From this we get the conjectures:
2A node with high degree implies a node with high connectivity.
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Conjecture 1. If the critical degree ratio is low, i.e. the ratio between critical
degree and number of nodes in the network, the resulting network will with high
probability be a clique.
Conjecture 2. If the critical degree ratio is at a medium level, the resulting
network will with high probability be a star.
Conjecture 3. If the critical degree ratio is high, the resulting network will with
high probability be a star-like/scale-free structure.
A numerical example of the boundaries between the different structures, we found
from our simulation (described in the next section) with 20 nodes is the following:
As seen in Figure 5.12 a critical degree of 1-5 applies to conjecture 1, 6-12 applies to
conjecture 2 and 13-20 applies to conjecture 3.
Results and findings
To prove the conjectures above, we created a simulator. The rules of the simulator
are as following: Every round of the game,two random nodes, not neighbors, are
selected, and asked if they would want to establish a link. The link establishment is
a symmetric decision, i.e. the link is established if it result in an increased payoff
for both nodes. If the link is added, we check if either of the nodes would prefer to
delete some of their already existing links, this decision is asymmetric. A link will be
deleted if the node will achieve a higher payoff without it. Then we ask the rest of
the nodes if they would like to delete any links. This procedure is repeated as long
as it is possible to add new links. The payoff function of each node is as described
earlier (see Eq.(5.39)), except that the cost is now dependent on the degree of the
node. For the simulations to be realizable, we had to set the number of nodes to
20, or else the computational time would be to high. For every critical degree, from
three to nineteen, we ran 50 simulations, and noted the resulting network formation.
We chose to start from critical degree equal three, since any number below would
result in a clique, because it would be more beneficial to be directly connected to
every node.
We know that if Eq.(5.41) is satisfied for all i, then the efficient and stable state
is a star. But a more interesting scenario occurs when we have a graph where one or
more of the nodes reaches the critical degree. -Will the final structure be scale-free,
a star or simply just unstructured? The results from the simulation can be seen
in Figure 5.12, 5.13 and 5.15. As we see from Figure 5.12, the probability of the
resulting network being a star suddenly increases from zero to 42% at critical degree
five to six, and then jumps from 42 to 70-, 86-,96-, 98% at critical degree six to nine.
These results confirm our conjectures, and show that the discount can drastically
increase the probability of the network ending up in a star.
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Figure 5.12: Shows the probability of the network ending up in a star, given different
critical degrees.
From Figure 5.13 we can observe that the opposite is happening when the critical
degree is increased; the probability of the resulting network being a clique drastically
decreases. As we can see with a critical degree of seven or higher, it is very unlikely
that we end up with a clique. These findings support our conjectures.
An interesting comparison can be made between the emergence of a star versus a
clique. Figure 5.14 shows a plot of the network resulting in a star and another plot of
the probability for the resulting network to become a clique. As we can see, from a
critical degree of five to seven, the resulting network structure, changes from almost
certainly ending up in a clique, to almost certainly ending up in a star structure.
The reason is as mentioned before that when the critical degree is low, the likelihood
of many nodes reaching the critical degree is high. And none of these would like to
delete any links. Hence we end up with a clique. The reason why we end up with
star structures is because it is less likely that many nodes end up reaching the critical
degree, hence most of the nodes still prefer to rely on indirect links, but the ones
that reach the critical degree prefer to connect to everyone. Since the nodes with
critical degree, have high connectivity, nodes will prefer to be connected with these,
compared with other nodes. Nodes prefer to be connected to the ones with critical
degree, the nodes with critical degree would like to connect to everyone, and thus
the structure evolves into a star, with the critical degree node in the center.
In Figure 5.12 when the critical degree gets closer to the number of nodes in the
network, the probability of the network evolving into a star decreases. However, in
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Figure 5.13: Shows the probability of the network ending up in a clique, given
different critical degrees.
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Figure 5.14: Shows the comparison between the probability of the network ending
up in a star (blue) or clique (red), given different critical degrees.
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Figure 5.15: Shows the probability of the network ending up in a scale-free structure,
given different critical degrees.
Figure 5.15, we have plotted the probability of the network evolving into a network
where only a few(2-4) nodes end up with a high degree, but not necessarily a critical
degree. As we see, this occurs with high probability from critical degree six and
up. These networks are so called scale-free networks (A-B graphs, described in the
methodology chapter), because there are a few hubs, that account for most of the
connectivity in the network. The reason why we end up with a scale-free network is
because nodes prefer to be connected with nodes with high connectivity, and thus
will delete links to nodes with low connectivity. This is very similar to the simple
model that creates scale-free networks, where the probability of connecting to a node
is proportional to the degree of the node.
Price of Anarchy. Another interesting thing is the average price of anarchy
as function of the critical degree. The price of anarchy was calculated by taking the
average total payoffs and dividing on the optimal payoff. The result can be seen in
Figure 5.16.
We see that the price of anarchy for the first critical degrees is 1, and then
decreases until degree six, and at seven it increases again. This is because at degree
one to five, the socially optimal structure is a clique. At degree six, a clique and
a star, are almost equally good, and at degree seven and up, a star structure is
the socially optimal outcome. In other words, when the cost is low, a clique is the
optimal structure, and when the cost is high a star is the optimal structure.
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Figure 5.16: Shows the price of anarchy as a function of critical degree
This further improves our findings, because we have now shown how an insurer
can determine the resulting network formation by changing the cost. In addition,
the formation that evolves has a price of anarchy close to 1.
Example structures from the simulation. In Figure 5.17 we see two of the
many possible outcomes when the critical degree is achieved at a low node degree.
As we see, most of the nodes have reached the critical degree, and thus connected
to every other node. In Figure 5.18 we see one example of a scalefree network, and
the standard star network, both with twenty nodes, and results from the simulations
when the critical degree was set to a value above six.
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(a) A clique consisting of twenty nodes.
(b) A network with high average node degree, but not a clique.
Figure 5.17: Two different outcomes of the simulations where the critical degree is
low
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(a) A star consisting of twenty nodes
(b) A scalefree network with twenty nodes, where three nodes account for most of
the connectivity.
Figure 5.18: Two different outcomes from running simulations with a high critical
degree.
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6.1 Discussion
From our background study, it was revealed that the current market for cyber-
insurance is far from healthy, and many have failed in attempts to establish a
cyber-insurance market, also here in Norway. As described in the introduction, there
are certain obstacles that are unique for cyber-insurance, and arguably these are
the reasons why cyber-insurance has not emerged as expected. However, we believe
that there is a need for cyber-insurance, and that our new approach of analyzing
the cyber-insurance market through graphs and network formation games could help
establishing and improving the market.
We studied a variety of different network formation games, in order to find out
if there were any superior network topologies that would fit as a cyber-insurance
network, were ideally both the insurer and customers get a higher payoff from
purchasing cyber-insurance. We found that star and clique networks had appropriate
characteristics, not only do they have calculable fixation probability, but they could
also generate better security and overall higher payoff for the nodes. With these
networks in mind, we wanted to find a way of forcing networks to evolve into these
structures. We found that insurers could adjust the insurance premium in order to
control the formation of networks. If the price is set to the right level, networks
with calculable risk will evolve, and if the insurer is able to separate the nodes
into two different networks, one consisting of trusted, insured nodes, the other of
non-insured nodes, the trusted nodes can even further increase their payoff, compared
to a non-trusted network. The insurer now possesses a tool for setting the insurance
premium properly, possible resulting in better products for both the customer and
the insurer.
We created several different models, where the first model showed a very simple
and naïve way for the insurer to separate insured and non-insured nodes into two
cliques. To make the model more applicable to real-world scenarios, we created
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several models, and for each model we added some new features. To get an overview
of the models we created, we refer to Figure 5.1.
In model 2a we made model 1 realizable, by including the parameters: expected
cost of risk, insurance cost and the benefit per link. Then we analyzed the parameters
and found out when and how different network structures would evolve. By adjusting
the insurance cost to the right level, the insurer can make the network formation
game end up in a giant clique of both insured and non-insured nodes, or a clique
of only insured nodes and another of only non-insured nodes. The condition for
separating insured from non-insured nodes are: β − r < Il < β, additionally if β > r,
the non-insured nodes will also form a clique, and the resulting network will be
two cliques. The solution is pairwise stable, since the change in payoff is linear and
non-dependent on the rest of the network, when a link is added, there is no reason
to remove it later. And since the resulting network consists of one or two cliques, it
is not possible to add any more links. This holds for models 1, 2, 3 and 4. We also
showed that when the insurer sets the cost such that the network ends up in two
cliques, it is not the socially optimal, because the network will suffer from the lost
benefits of connections between insured and non-insured nodes, i.e. it has a price of
anarchy less than 1.
In model 2b, we showed that to be able to separate the networks into two cliques,
the nodes must know the other nodes’ types. Otherwise, the nodes will have an
incentive to pretend to be an insured node, which will result in an untrusted network.
We think it is reasonable to assume that nodes in a real world-scenario know whether
their transactional partner has insurance or not, therefore we chose not to include
this uncertainty in the other models.
In model 3 we applied the model to certain real-world scenarios, such as software
development firms/chains, or other networks where the final product is dependent on
the collaboration of multiple participants. This was done by including a bonus, which
is first received when a node reaches the desired number of links (called max-degree).
This made the separation process of insured and non-insured nodes more difficult
for the insurer. Due to the possibility of achieving the bonus, a node will have more
incentive to establish links, and is thus more accepting towards establishing links
with risky nodes. The conditions for separating insured and non-insured nodes in this
scenario are: β + γ − r < Il < β + γm . For the separation of insured and non-insured
nodes to be possible, the following has to hold: 1− 1m < rm . As we see, as γ and/or
m increases, this gets more and more difficult to achieve.
In Model 4 we tried to implement a common feature used by insurance companies,
bulk discount, in order to see how this affected the network formation. The cost of
insuring a link is now dependent on the node’s degree. We implemented this feature
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on both model 2 and 3, which resulted in even higher incentive for insured nodes
to establish links with non-insured nodes. The reason is intuitive, since the cost of
doing so decreases as the node degree increases. When we applied the discount on
model 2, the conditions for ensuring separation of insured and non-insured nodes
were: NI(β − r) < Il < β, where NI represents the number of insured nodes in the
network. This condition is very strong, because for the separation to be possible
the following has to hold: NI(β − r) < β. As we see, it is now more difficult for the
insurer to separate insured and non-insured nodes, compared to model 2, because
now the lower boundary on the insurance cost is multiplied with the number of
insured nodes in the network (NI × (β − r)).
When applying the discount to model 3, the condition to ensure separation
becomes: m(β + γ − r) < Il < β + γm , and as in the other models, this further
complicates the separation process for the insurer.
We also showed that the price of anarchy is even higher when applying discount
to model 2. This is because the costs are decreasing, and thus when we have two
separate cliques, the potential lost payoff between them will increase. When we
included both bonus and discount, the calculation of price of anarchy became too
complex. However, we see that the incentive for establishing links has increased, and
thus the insurer has to set a higher price to compensate for this, and therefore the
potential price of anarchy is even higher i.e. the more incentive for link establishment
you have, the harder it gets to ensure separation of the nodes.
In our last model we applied our model 4 (discount) to an already existing model,
"the symmetric connection game". In this old game it has been shown that there are
three different efficient and stable networks, clique, star and an empty network, that
arise under certain cost conditions. If Il < β − β2, the efficient and stable network is
a clique. If β − β2 < Il < β a star is both stable and efficient. If Il > β + N−22 β2
an empty network is both stable and efficient. In general, a clique is the most
efficient if the cost of establishing links is less than the benefit gained from indirect
connections. A star is the most efficient if the cost is higher than the benefit from
indirect connections, but less than the benefit of direct connections. Unfortunately,
it is proved that as the number of nodes in the networks increases, the probability of
the network ending up in star goes to zero. However, when we applied our insurance
discount to this model, we found conjectures saying that, by setting the cost to the
right level, one can with high probability ensure that either a clique, a star or a
scale-free structure will evolve. This changes the connection game drastically, because
now the insurer is able to force the network into three possible network formations,
where the star has a fixation probability that exceeds the cliques. The insurer can use
these findings to ensure that one of the beneficial structures, star or clique evolves.
If the insurer is able to force a star to evolve, this can be used to drastically increase
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the overall security, and at the same time minimize the overall link cost.
Limitations and future work One limitation to our work, and a suggestion
for future work, is to map our models and simulations to real-world networks in a
more convincing way. Real-world networks are not random. Nodes may prefer to talk
to nodes with high degree or low degree. In addition, the decision to use additive risk
were taken due to the simplicity of the function and the fact that we do not know
how a real-world risk distribution actually looks like. By introducing a complex risk
function, we would only have distorted the goal of our models. i.e. suggestions for
improving our models is to introduce more realistic payoff functions.
Another interesting thing to research, is the game of choosing insurance or not.
In future work this should be applied to our models, but this could also possibly be
too complex, and only disrupt the models.
6.2 Conclusion
So far, cyber-insurance has failed to reach its promising potential, and many have
failed to establish a sustainable cyber-insurance market. We believe that cyber-
insurance is an essential part of the internet economy, and that our new approach of
analyzing the cyber-insurance market through graphs and network formation games
could help improving and establishing a better market.
We surveyed literature on networks and risk, and found recent literature that
showed how graphs like cliques, star, super-star, funnel and meta-funnel all have a
calculable fixation probability, and that stars and funnels fixation probability exceeds
the one of a clique. With these structures in mind, we created and analyzed different
network formation games, and tried to find link-cost constraints, which enabled these
structures to evolve.
In models one to four, we found cost constraints to separate insured and non-
insured nodes into two cliques. For each model, we added some new features that
made the model more applicable to real world scenarios, and for every feature added,
it became more difficult for the insurer to separate the two types of nodes. This is
due to the increased incentive for establishing links, and thus the nodes became more
and more accepting towards risk.
In the last model, we introduced the concept of bulk insurance into an already
existing network formation game, "the symmetric connection game", and showed that
this enabled the insurer to determine, with high probability, when and how, cliques,
stars or scale-free network would evolve. We showed that at a point, called critical
degree, a node’s optimal strategy would change from relying on indirect connections,
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to suddenly wanting to connect to everyone. If the critical degree is set to the right
level, one can ensure that the different structures evolve. If the critical degree is
set to a low degree, a clique will most certainly evolve, at a medium level, a star
will evolve, and at a high level, a scale-free network will evolve. We proved this
by performing multiple simulations, 50 simulations for every critical degree. What
makes this a very interesting finding, is that in the connection game, earlier research
has proven that as the number of nodes increases, the probability of the network
reaching a star goes towards zero. However, by introducing a discount, that will
subsidize the center node, one can drastically increase the probability of the network
ending up in a star.
In summary, we have shown how insurers can determine the resulting structure
of insurance networks, by adjusting the insurance cost, for several network formation
games. We have also showed how insurers can be assisted in calculating the overall
probability of fixation. We found these conditions for several models, with different
properties that relate them to the real world and other insurance products. We
believe our findings can help the cyber-insurance market evolve into a viable and
better market.
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AppendixAAnalysis
A.1 Analysis of model 2b: Incomplete information
In this section we present the analysis and mathematics for model 2b: Incomplete
information.
When facing a game with incomplete information, there exists two types of
equilibrium’s, one where node 2 is able to separate node 1’s type, called separating
equilibrium. The other is where he is not able to separate them, called pooling
equilibrium. We have two types of node, type 1 (t1): insured and type 2 (t2): not
insured.
Node 2 is insured. There are two different games to model, one where node
2 is insured, and the other where he is not insured. We start with the one where he
is insured. Node 1’s type is chosen randomly by nature, with probability p of being
type 1 and 1− p of being type 2.
Figure A.1: Signalling game with two nodes, node 1’s type choosen by nature, node
2 is insured. Node 1 have complete information, node 2 suffer from incomplete
information, and act on best response functions based on beliefs.
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In the extensive-form shown in Figure A.1, we see that t2′s strategy L dominates
N, and thus t2 will never play N .
Separating equilibrium. Since node 1 will never play N as type 2, there are
only one possible separating equilibrium, type 1 plays L and type 2 plays N . Hence
node 2’s beliefs are as in Eq.(A.1).
σ1(ti) =
{
N, if t1
L, if t2
(A.1)
Let µ1(ti|N), denote the probability that node 1 is of type ti. By using bayes rule
we get this equation:
µ1(t1|N) = P (N |t1)P (t1)
P (N) =
P (N |t1)P (t1)
P (N |t1)P (t1) + P (N |t2)P (t2) (A.2)
With node 2’s belief, we get that µ1(t1|N) = 1 and µ1(t2|L) = 1. We can now
calculate node 2’s expected utility from playing L and N:
EU2(L,L) = µ1(t1|L)U2(L,L; t1) + µ1(t2|L)U2(L,L; t2)
→ EU2(L,L) = Ui + β − Il − r (A.3)
EU2(N,L) = µ1(t1|L)U2(N,L; t1) + µ1(t2|L)U2(N,L; t2)
→ EU2(N,L) = Ui (A.4)
From these two equations we see that the best response of node 2(BR2) when he
observes the other node choosing action L is:
BR2(L) =
{
L, if β − r ≥ Il
N, if β − r < Il
(A.5)
Node 2’s expected utility when type 1 chooses N, is easily seen to be Ui. To confirm
if this is a separating equilibrium we must see if node 1 has any incentive to deviate
from the strategies in node 2’s belief. Type 2 will never deviate, so lets investigate
type 1. In order to get node 1 to be willing to play N when he knows node 2’s best
response function, the following must hold: β < Il. If this is true, then node 2’s best
response is to play N. I.e. the only separating equilibrium is the following:
β < Il (A.6)
σ1 =
{
N, if t1
L, if t2
(A.7)
BR2(σ1) = N (A.8)
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This means that in a separating equilibrium, the game will end up with no link
establishment.
Pooling equilibrium. In a pooling equilibrium node 2 will not be able to
distinguish the two types, and since t1’s strategy L dominates N , i.e. there is only
one possible equilibrium, the one where both types of node 1 plays L.
σ1(ti) =
{
L, if t1
L, if t2
(A.9)
By using bayes rule we get that µ(t1|L) = p and µ(t2|L) = 1− p. Node 2’s expected
utility is then:
EU2(L,L) = p(Ui + β − Il) + (1− p)(Ui + β − Il − r)
→ EU2(L,L) = Ui + β − Il − r + pr (A.10)
EU2(N,L) = Ui (A.11)
From this we get node2’s best response:
BR2(L) =
{
L, if β + rp− r ≥ Il
N, if β + rp− r < Il
(A.12)
By using this best response function, node 1 sees that as long as β > Il he will never
deviate from node 2’s beliefs. Hence, it is a pooling equilibrium where both nodes
choose L, as long as β > Il and β + rp− r > Il. We also know that: rp− r ≤ 0 is
always true, and thus there also exists a pooling equilibrium where node 1, plays L,
and node 2, plays N . This equilibrium will occur when β > Il and β + rp− r < Il.
Node 2 not insured. Here we will analyze the game when node 2 is not
insured. The rules of the game are as before, the only thing that has changed is the
type of node 2, and thus the payoffs are different and we need to see if there exists
separating and pooling equilibrium in this game as well.
Separating equilibrium. In this game there is no dominant strategy for node
1, thus we have to check for the two possible separating equilibriums. We start with
the separating equilibrium with the beliefs shown in Eq.(A.13).
σ1(ti) =
{
L, if t1
N, if t2
(A.13)
With the beliefs in Eq.(A.13), this is node 2’s expected payoffs:
EU2(L,L) = (Ui + β) (A.14)
EU2(N,L) = (Ui) (A.15)
86 A. ANALYSIS
Figure A.2: Signalling game with two nodes, node 1’s type choosen by nature, node2
is not insured. Node 1 have complete information, node 2 suffer from incomplete
information, and act on best response functions based on beliefs.
From this we see that his best response when node 1’s action is L, is to allways play
L:
BR2(L) = L (A.16)
To see if this is an equilibrium, we have to see if node 1 has any incentive to deviate.
We need to check for the two types of node 1: If β > r then type 2 would deviate,
because he could achieve a higher payoff by playing L, given the beliefs of node 2 in
Eq.(A.13). Hence we know that for this to be an equilibrium, the following has to
hold
β < r (A.17)
When analyzing from node 1 type 1’s perspective, for him to play L, this has to
hold: Ui + β − Il − r > Ui. The only way this can hold is if β > Il + r. We see that
Eq.(A.17) is violating this condition, and thus we have no separating equilibrium
with the beliefs in Eq.(A.13).
Now lets look at the other possible separating equilibrium, see Eq.(A.18).
σ1(ti) =
{
N, if t1
L, if t2
(A.18)
Node 2’s expected payoffs are as follows:
EU2(L,L) = Ui + β − r (A.19)
EU2(N,L) = Ui (A.20)
From this we get the best response function:
BR2(L) =
{
L, if β ≥ r
N, if β < r
(A.21)
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For this to be a separating equilibrium, we need to see if node 1 would deviate from
node 2’s beliefs. Type t1 will not deviate as long as β < Il + r. Type t2 will not
deviate if β ≥ r, if this condition is true, we see that node 2 will play L. I.e. the only
separating equilibrium that exists is when node 2 plays L, node 1 of type t1 plays N
and node 1 of type t2 plays L. For this to happen we get this condition on β.
Il + r > β > r (A.22)
Pooling equilibrium. Two possible, one where both types of node 1 plays L,
and one where both types plays N . Lets first analyze the one where both types of
node 1 plays L.
σ1(ti) =
{
L, if t1
L, if t2
(A.23)
With the beliefs shown above, node 2’s expected payoffs are:
EU2(L) = p(Ui + β) + (1− p)(Ui + β − r)
EU2(L) = Ui + β − r + pr (A.24)
EU2(N) = Ui (A.25)
From this we get the best response function :
BR2(L) =
{
L, if β ≥ r − pr
N, if β < r − pr (A.26)
Will node 1 deviate knowing this? Type t1 will not deviate as long as: β − Il ≥ r,
and type t2 will not deviate as long as β > r. From this we get the final condition, if
β − Il ≥ r then there exists a pooling equilibrium where both types of node 1 plays
L and node 2 also play L. From this we see that the other pooling equilibrium where
both types of node 1, plays N , will only occur when β < r and β < Il + r.

turtles-own[ 
  insured? 
  checked? 
  numberofedges 
  payoff 
] 
globals[ 
  numberofïnsued 
  numberofnotinsured 
  donewithinsured?  
  donewithnotinsured? 
  ] 
to setup 
  clear-all 
  setup-turtles 
  reset-ticks 
  set numberofïnsued 0 
  set donewithinsured? false 
  set donewithnotinsured? false 
  setup-patches 
end 
  
AppendixBSimulation models
B.1 Model 2: Including parameters
Here is the Netlogo source code, used to create the simulator for model 2.
 to setup-turtles 
  set-default-shape turtles "circle"  
   
  crt num-nodes  
  layout-circle turtles max-pxcor - 20 
  ask turtles [  
    set payoff 0 
    set insured? false 
    set checked? false 
    set color red 
     
     if (random-float 100.0 <(prob-insured))[ 
      set color green 
      set insured? true 
      set numberofïnsued (numberofïnsued + 1) 
      ]   
  ] 
  ;ask turtles [ set label who set label-color black] 
 
end 
 
to setup-patches 
ask patches [ 
  set pcolor white 
  ] 
end 
 
to go 
   if not donewithinsured? [ 
    add-edge 
  ] 
  tick 
end 
 
to add-edge 
 let node1 one-of turtles with[not checked?] 
 if node1 = nobody 
 [ 
   display 
   user-message "insured clique finished" 
   stop 
   ] 
  ask node1[ 
    let node2 one-of turtles with [not link-neighbor? node1 and (self != node1) and not 
checked?] 
     
    ifelse node2 = nobody 
   [   
      set checked? true 
      add-edge 
     ] 
   [ 
     let nolinkpayoff payoff 
     ifelse insured? 
     [ 
       ;node1 is insured 
       ask node2 
       [ 
         let nolinkpayoff2 payoff 
         ifelse insured? 
         [ 
           ;node2 and node1 insured 
           let newpayoff1 (nolinkpayoff + (beta / 100) - (insurancelink / 100 )) 
           let newpayoff2 (nolinkpayoff2 + (beta / 100) - (insurancelink / 100 )) 
           if newpayoff1 > nolinkpayoff and newpayoff2 > nolinkpayoff2 
           [ 
             ;add link 
             create-link-with node1 
             set payoff newpayoff2 
             ask node1[ 
               set payoff newpayoff1 
                
             ] 
           ] 
           ;done with adding link 
           ] 
         [;begin else 
           ;node2 not insured 
           let newpayoff1 (nolinkpayoff + (beta / 100) - (risk / 100) - (insurancelink / 100 )) 
           let newpayoff2 (nolinkpayoff2 + (beta / 100)) 
           if newpayoff1 > nolinkpayoff and newpayoff2 > nolinkpayoff2 
           [ 
             ;add link 
             create-link-with node1 
             set payoff newpayoff2 
             ask node1[ 
               set payoff newpayoff1 
extensions [nw table] 
links-own [ weight ] 
turtles-own [ 
  dict;dictionary with shortest path to every node 
  insured? 
  checked? 
  payoff 
  cost-of-link-with-other-turtles ;; 
  distance-from-other-turtles 
  indirpayoffbefore 
  indirpayoffafter 
  degree   
  ] 
globals[ 
donewithinsured? 
infinity 
newpayoff1 
newpayoff2 
nolinkpayoff 
nolinkpayoff2 
nr1 
nr2 
 
] 
to setup-shape 
  clear-all 
  setup-patches 
  nw:generate-ring turtles links 10 [ set color red ] 
 nw:set-snapshot turtles links 
  layout 
  set infinity 99999 
 
  ask turtles [ 
    set indirpayoffbefore 0 
    set indirpayoffafter 0 
    set payoff 0 
    set insured? true 
    set checked? false 
    set color green 
    let node-count count turtles 
    let x 0 
  ] 
  
B.2 Model 3: Including maximum node degree and bonus
Here is the Netlogo source code, used to create the simulator for model 3.
   compute-inital-payoff 
   nw:set-snapshot turtles links 
  reset-ticks 
end 
to setup-star 
  clear-all 
  setup-patches 
  setup-turtles-star 
  reset-ticks 
end 
to setup 
  clear-all 
  setup-patches 
  setup-turtles 
  reset-ticks 
end 
 
to setup-turtles-star 
  setup-patches 
  set-default-shape turtles "circle" 
  nw:generate-star turtles links num-nodes 
  nw:set-snapshot turtles links 
  layout 
  set infinity 99999 
  ask turtles [ 
    set indirpayoffbefore 0 
    set indirpayoffafter 0 
    set payoff 0 
    set insured? true 
    set checked? false 
    set color green 
    let node-count count turtles 
    let x 0 
  ] 
  compute-inital-payoff 
   nw:set-snapshot turtles links 
end 
to setup-turtles 
  set-default-shape turtles "circle"  
  set infinity 99999 
  crt num-nodes  
  layout-circle turtles max-pxcor - 20 
  ask turtles [ 
    set indirpayoffbefore 0 
    set indirpayoffafter 0 
    set payoff 0 
    set insured? true 
    set checked? false 
    set color green 
    let node-count count turtles 
    let x 0 
  ] 
   nw:set-snapshot turtles links 
  ;ask turtles [ set label who set label-color black 
end 
 
to compute-inital-payoff 
  find-path-lengths 
  ask turtles [ 
    set degree count link-neighbors 
    let nr who 
    let i 0 
    let j 1 
    set payoff 0 
   foreach distance-from-other-turtles [ 
     if( ? < 999 )[  
         if(? != 0)[ 
           set payoff (payoff +( (beta / 100) ^ ? )) 
         ] 
         if( ? = 1)[        
             set payoff (payoff - ((insurancelink / 100 )  / (j))) 
             set j j + 1         
     ]  
     ] 
   ]  
  ] 
end 
 
to setup-patches 
ask patches [ 
  set pcolor white 
  ] 
end 
 
to go 
    add-edge-simpler 
    delete 
    layout 
    tick 
end 
to delete 
  let i 0 
  while [i < count turtles ] 
  [ 
    check-delete i 
    set i i + 1 
    ] 
end 
to add-edge-simpler 
  set newpayoff1 -1 
  set newpayoff2 -1 
  set nolinkpayoff 0 
  set nolinkpayoff2 0 
  compute-inital-payoff 
  let node1 one-of turtles 
  if( node1 = nobody)[ 
    display 
    user-message "ferdig" 
    stop 
  ] 
  set nr1 0 
  set nr2 0 
  let link? false 
  ask node1[ 
    set nolinkpayoff payoff 
    set nr1 who  
    let node2 one-of turtles with [not link-neighbor? node1 and (self != node1) and not checked?] 
    ifelse node2 = nobody 
    [ 
      set checked? true  
    ] 
    [ 
      ask node2 [set nr2 who 
        set nolinkpayoff2 payoff 
        ] 
      set link? true 
    ] 
  ] 
  if( link?)[ 
  create-and-check-path nr1 nr2 
  check-delete nr1 
  check-delete nr2 
  ] 
end 
 
to setup-indivudal-map 
  let j 0 
  let c count turtles 
  while [j < c][ 
  ask turtle j[ 
  let i 0 
  set dict table:make 
  while [i <= c - 1][ 
  if j != i[ 
    table:put dict i nw:path-to turtle i 
    ] 
  set i i + 1 
  ;end while 
  ] 
  ;end ask 
  ] 
  set j j + 1 
  ;end while 
  ] 
   
end 
 
to check-delete[a] 
extensions [nw table] 
links-own [ weight ] 
turtles-own [ 
  dict;dictionary with shortest path to every node 
  insured? 
  checked? 
  payoff 
  cost-of-link-with-other-turtles ;; 
  distance-from-other-turtles 
  indirpayoffbefore 
  indirpayoffafter 
  degree   
  ] 
globals[ 
donewithinsured? 
infinity 
newpayoff1 
newpayoff2 
nolinkpayoff 
nolinkpayoff2 
nr1 
nr2 
 
] 
to setup-shape 
  clear-all 
  setup-patches 
  nw:generate-ring turtles links 10 [ set color red ] 
 nw:set-snapshot turtles links 
  layout 
  set infinity 99999 
  ask turtles [ 
    set indirpayoffbefore 0 
    set indirpayoffafter 0 
    set payoff 0 
    set insured? true 
    set checked? false 
    set color green 
    let node-count count turtles 
    let x 0 
  ] 
  
B.3 Model 5: Network externalities
Here is the Netlogo source code, used to create the simulator for model 5.
   compute-inital-payoff 
   nw:set-snapshot turtles links 
  reset-ticks 
end 
to setup-star 
  clear-all 
  setup-patches 
  setup-turtles-star 
  reset-ticks 
end 
to setup 
  clear-all 
  setup-patches 
  setup-turtles 
  reset-ticks 
end 
 
to setup-turtles-star 
  setup-patches 
  set-default-shape turtles "circle" 
  nw:generate-star turtles links num-nodes 
  nw:set-snapshot turtles links 
  layout 
  set infinity 99999 
  ask turtles [ 
    set indirpayoffbefore 0 
    set indirpayoffafter 0 
    set payoff 0 
    set insured? true 
    set checked? false 
    set color green 
    let node-count count turtles 
    let x 0 
  ] 
  compute-inital-payoff 
   nw:set-snapshot turtles links 
end 
to setup-turtles 
  set-default-shape turtles "circle"  
  set infinity 99999 
  crt num-nodes  
  layout-circle turtles max-pxcor - 20 
  ask turtles [ 
    set indirpayoffbefore 0 
    set indirpayoffafter 0 
    set payoff 0 
    set insured? true 
    set checked? false 
    set color green 
    let node-count count turtles 
    let x 0 
  ] 
   nw:set-snapshot turtles links 
  ;ask turtles [ set label who set label-color black 
end 
 
to compute-inital-payoff 
  find-path-lengths 
  ask turtles [ 
    set degree count link-neighbors 
    let nr who 
    let i 0 
    let j 1 
    set payoff 0 
   foreach distance-from-other-turtles [ 
     if( ? < 999 )[  
         if(? != 0)[ 
           set payoff (payoff +( (beta / 100) ^ ? )) 
         ] 
         if( ? = 1)[        
             set payoff (payoff - ((insurancelink / 100 )  / (j))) 
             set j j + 1         
     ]  
     ] 
   ]  
  ] 
end 
 
to setup-patches 
ask patches [ 
  set pcolor white 
  ] 
end 
 
to go 
    add-edge-simpler 
    delete 
    layout 
    tick 
end 
to delete 
  let i 0 
  while [i < count turtles ] 
  [ 
    check-delete i 
    set i i + 1 
    ] 
end 
to add-edge-simpler 
  set newpayoff1 -1 
  set newpayoff2 -1 
  set nolinkpayoff 0 
  set nolinkpayoff2 0 
  compute-inital-payoff 
  let node1 one-of turtles 
  if( node1 = nobody)[ 
    display 
    user-message "ferdig" 
    stop 
  ] 
  set nr1 0 
  set nr2 0 
  let link? false 
  ask node1[ 
    set nolinkpayoff payoff 
    set nr1 who  
    let node2 one-of turtles with [not link-neighbor? node1 and (self != node1) and not checked?] 
    ifelse node2 = nobody 
    [ 
      set checked? true  
    ] 
    [ 
      ask node2 [set nr2 who 
        set nolinkpayoff2 payoff 
        ] 
      set link? true 
    ] 
  ] 
  if( link?)[ 
  create-and-check-path nr1 nr2 
  check-delete nr1 
  check-delete nr2 
  ] 
end 
 
to setup-indivudal-map 
  let j 0 
  let c count turtles 
  while [j < c][ 
  ask turtle j[ 
  let i 0 
  set dict table:make 
  while [i <= c - 1][ 
  if j != i[ 
    table:put dict i nw:path-to turtle i 
    ] 
  set i i + 1 
  ;end while 
  ] 
  ;end ask 
  ] 
  set j j + 1 
  ;end while 
  ] 
   
end 
 
to check-delete[a] 
